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I first learned about accounting research during a graduate course at Tilburg Univer-
sity in the Fall of 2013. Since some of the course’s contents went against my prior
experiences and thoughts, I often questioned and discussed these contents with the
teachers and other students during the lectures. By the end of the course, I had built
quite a reputation for myself, and I was worried that my skepticism and the dissonance
between my thoughts and the contents of the course would lead me to fail the course.
It was to my great surprise, however, that I passed the course with excellence. Not
much later, one of its teachers, Bart Dierynck, recruited me into the research track
of Tilburg University (i.e., the Research Master program) which ultimately led me to
pursue the degree of Ph.D. in Accounting under Bart’s primary supervision.
I am grateful for Bart’s mentorship over the past couple of years. His diverse academic
track record, creativity, and writing skills make him an excellent supervisor. Bart is
also an empathetic supervisor which not only helps him understand his students better
but also makes him excel at understanding how participants react during the labora-
tory experiments that we design for our research. There is also a personal connection
between Bart and me. I have spent countless hours, sometimes even full days, in Bart’s
office discussing research and throwing ideas back and forth. What makes these discus-
sions valuable is that we can be each other’s worst critic. Since Bart’s office becomes a
rather monotonous environment after a while, we frequently relocated our discussions
to the local Starbucks and the beautiful forest behind Tilburg University. When our
discussions lasted into the evening, we often relied on Sofie (Bart’s spouse) to put them
to an end. These experiences with Bart comprise one of the main reasons why I chose
to pursue a career in academia, and I hope we can continue to foster our personal and
professional relationship in the future.
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Eddy Cardinaels, my co-supervisor, has also fulfilled an important role in my academic
upbringing and interest in experimental accounting research. One of Eddy’s most fre-
quently used phrases is “I will squeeze it in somewhere in the upcoming weeks.” It
illustrates that Eddy is a helpful supervisor with a busy schedule. Eddy always had
an open-door policy, and he would make room in his already busy schedule to an-
swer my questions and sit down with me to chat over a cup of coffee. Discussions and
meetings with Eddy are typically characterized by a strong sense of humor and by
enthusiasm for conducting experiments and generating new insights. Eddy excels at
designing innovative and interesting experiments, and he thrives at solving difficult
issues in experimental designs. Eddy has also increased my understanding of how to
sell ideas in research papers. Overall, he is one of the primary reasons why initially I
fell in love with laboratory experiments and studies.
My gratitude also goes to my other dissertation committee members, Rob Bloomfield,
Willie Choi, Alexander Brüggen, and Christoph Hörner. Rob has impacted my devel-
opment during the early stages of the Ph.D. program significantly. I followed one of
Rob’s Ph.D. seminars on data gathering techniques in 2015. After the Ph.D. seminar,
Rob helped arrange a research visit to Cornell University. Next to being an outstanding
scholar, Rob gives something back to the academic community, and, in particular, to
Ph.D. students. My interactions with Willie at conferences and Ph.D. colloquia have
also contributed greatly to my perspective of experimental accounting research and of
academia more generally. Willie’s advice on living and working as a Ph.D. student and
as a junior faculty member were particularly useful. Also, I am grateful for the insight-
ful and helpful comments and suggestions of Alexander and Christoph. Their input
has improved the quality of the three studies that comprise my Ph.D. dissertation
significantly.
I would also like to thank the other Ph.D. students at Tilburg University for their help
and friendship. Ties de Kok and Yusiyu Wang, in particular, deserve my gratitude
because we formed our Ph.D. cohort at the Department of Accountancy (i.e., the
“Three Musketeers”). I have benefited greatly from having Ties as a colleague, friend,
and co-author. He is a talented researcher with extensive programming skills, a knack
for passing down knowledge onto others, and a strong intellectual curiosity. Also, I
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can always rely on Christian Peters and Farah Arshad, both of whom started the
Ph.D. program after I did. All three of us specialize in laboratory experiments, and
we often provide each other with feedback and help each other develop new skills,
such as programming in Python and developing applications for running laboratory
experiments. Farah and I also co-authored a research paper that is presented in chapter
four of this dissertation.
I am also indebted to other members of the Department of Accountancy at Tilburg
University for their help and support. The Department of Accountancy has experi-
enced both ups and downs while I was a Research Master and Ph.D. student. The
determination and resilience of the Department of Accountancy have put it back on
the map today. I believe that the quality of teaching and research have improved.
Research done by our department has become more innovative while still adhering to
cornerstone traditions in the accounting literature. The Department of Accountancy
has also further leveled the playing field among its faculty. Research Master and Ph.D.
students, for instance, are considered members of the department and participate pro-
actively. I believe it is important to integrate Ph.D. students into the department
because it makes the transition to faculty member after the Ph.D. program much
easier. There are also a lot more spillovers between faculty, and stronger connections
have been established between the Department of Accountancy and other prominent
accounting faculty in the academic community. It is my hope that the Department of
Accountancy continues to pursue innovation and transparency in its policies and keeps
seeking a strong balance in terms of research orientation.
Without the support of my family, I probably would not have lasted long as a Research
Master and Ph.D. student. I am grateful for the help of my mother José-Marie, my
sister Ottelien, and my girlfriend Karen. They stood by me and helped me get back
on track when times were tough. Much of my spare time was relocated to academic
training and my career, but my family has always helped me find a way to make all of
it work. My mother has been an inspiration to me since I was young. For a long time,
she raised my sister and me largely on her own while working full-time to pursue a
professional career. Her example has always motivated me to work hard as she often
told me: “doing your best is not good enough.” When times are stressful, I can always
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rely on my sister to vent a little. Our relationship has grown over the past couple of
years, and she has become someone that I have immense fun with. Karen and I have
been together almost two and a half years. I can always rely on her both personally and
professionally. Since Karen is also an accounting scholar, she often gives me feedback
and is never afraid to criticize my work. Karen, we make each other stronger.
Many other people have helped me over the past couple of years, and all deserve my
gratitude. However, I will not compose the customary list of “other individuals” be-
cause the likelihood that I forget to mention someone is extremely high. However, I
will mention a few more groups and institutions that contributed to my learning expe-
rience and development during the Research Master and Ph.D. programs at Tilburg
University. My gratitude goes out to other scholars and educators at CentER research
institute for Economics and Management for providing me with world-class academic
training in the Research Master and Ph.D. program. After visiting a few other uni-
versities, and meeting quite a few other Ph.D. students over the past few years, I
have come to the stark conclusion that I have been privileged to have followed such a
high-quality and extensive academic program. I would also like to thank the Limperg
Institute for funding my research visit to Cornell University, and CentER for funding
my research and the research visit to Emory University. Lastly, I am greatly indebted
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1.1. A Dynamic Perspective
Management accounting systems are commonly used in organizations because they
have three distinct functions that improve performance and help organizations run
more efficiently (Demski and Feltham, 1976; Sprinkle and Williamson, 2006; Bloom-
field, 2017). First, management accounting systems facilitate decision-making by pro-
viding valuable information. For example, internal reporting systems provide top man-
agement with vital information that helps improve the quality of executive decisions
and the quality of information disclosed to outside investors (Bushman and Smith,
2001). Second, management accounting systems also influence decision-making in or-
ganizations. For instance, control systems help ensure that employees comply with
organizational policies. Lastly, management accounting systems facilitate the coordi-
nation of decisions in organizations, often across business units and hierarchical levels.
Budgeting systems, for example, collect essential information from managers, allowing
organizations to allocate resources more efficiently.
An important question for practitioners and academia is how management accounting
systems change over time. Empiricists in the field of accounting have long used field
studies, descriptive surveys, and public or proprietary data to examine this question
(e.g., Libby and Waterhouse, 1996; Busco, Quattrone, and Riccaboni, 2007; Davila
and Foster, 2005, 2007; Sandino, 2007; Labro and Stice-Lawrence, 2018). This line of
research mostly uses a systems perspective and focuses on how external factors, such
as competitive forces and regulatory pressures, and internal factors, such as an orga-
nization’s strategy and objectives, relate to how organizations physically design and
change management accounting systems. However, management accounting systems
are used, designed, and adapted by their users. This user-perspective demands more
attention because different users use management accounting systems for different pur-
poses. Also, experimental evidence suggests users may not always behave according
to the standard economic model of strictly selfish preferences (please see Cooper and
Kagel (2016) for an extensive review), which the systems perspective uses to under-
stand how organizations physically design management accounting systems (Brickley,
Clifford, and Zimmerman, 1995; Zimmerman, 2016).
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In this dissertation, I present three laboratory experiments that illuminate how differ-
ent users adjust and change how they use management accounting systems. Laboratory
experiments are well-equipped to examine the role of users because it enables us to
observe human decision-making and behavior directly and improve our inference of
causal relationships (see section 1.3 for a detailed discussion). Although laboratory ex-
periments that directly focus on this topic are relatively scarce, there are a few notable
exceptions. For example, Krishnan, Luft, and Shields (2002) experimentally examine
how changing market conditions impact how managers calibrate the accuracy of their
cost systems. Their results show that the accuracy of managers’ cost systems varies
significantly across market types and histories. Bloomfield and Luft (2006) examine
how sellers learn to compete in markets while relying on cost systems. They find that
learning to operate efficiently as a seller is hampered when sellers also carry responsi-
bility for the design of cost systems. While distinct in their specific research goals, the
three laboratory experiments in this dissertation join this collection of work to help
fill an important, yet lasting gap in the accounting literature (Birnberg, 1998).
1.2. Overview of Chapters
Much of our existing knowledge on how principals design and use control systems
originates from laboratory experiments that keep economic circumstances constant for
principals (e.g., Evans, Heiman-Hoffman, and Rau, 1994; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Car-
dinaels and Yin, 2015; Feichter, 2016; Cardinaels, Dierynck, Yin, and Beckers, 2018).
However, we know relatively little about how principals adjust their control over agents
when the economic costs of controlling agents change. In chapter two, I present a lab-
oratory experiment revealing that principals decrease control less when controlling
agents becomes more expensive than they increase control when controlling agents be-
comes cheaper. I examine the mechanisms of this asymmetric adjustment pattern and
provide evidence that principals exhibit this asymmetry because they develop “sticky”
beliefs that agents are self-interested and, therefore, need to be controlled. These be-
liefs cause principals to suppress information about an increase in the economic costs
of controlling agents. Further testing also reveals that the asymmetric adjustment pat-
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tern disappears when principals’ “sticky” beliefs about self-interested agents have less
time to develop.
Many organizations use rotation policies that rotate managers across business units
during their employment (Osterman, 2000; Jorgensen, Davis, Kotowski, Aedla, and
Dunning, 2005). Although empirical research on the consequences of rotation policies
have been well-documented in other academic fields (e.g., Meyer, 1994; Ortega, 2001;
Arya and Mittendorf, 2004; Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini, 2010), the impact of
rotation policies on how managers change how they use management accounting sys-
tems has received relatively little attention. In the third chapter, Bart Dierynck, Eddy
Cardinaels, and I examine how rotation policies impact how managers use reporting
systems. Specifically, we are interested in how the prospect of rotating to another busi-
ness units affects how managers’ report about operational distortions to performance
measurement in their current business unit. In our laboratory experiment, managers
can either exploit operational distortions at the cost of the firm or report operational
distortions to elicit rewards from the firm.
Prior economic literature suggests rotation policies enable firms to extract the same re-
ports about operational distortions from managers at a lower cost because the prospect
of rotating to another business unit lowers the economic value of operational distor-
tions for managers (Arya and Mittendorf, 2004, 2006; Prescott and Townsend, 2006).
Thus, firms can compensate managers less for producing the same reports about op-
erational distortions in their business unit. Although our results confirm that firms
benefit from having a rotation policy in place, it is for a different reason. We find that
rotation policies cause managers to report more operational distortions. We establish
that the prospect of rotation triggers managers to view their reporting decision less as
an economic decision and more as a decision that enables them to “do what’s right”
for the firm without the aim to benefit from it economically. Thus, our study presents
an undocumented benefit of rotation policies for how managers use reporting systems,
which may help explain the prevalence of rotation policies in practice.
In the fourth chapter, Farah Arshad, Bart Dierynck, and I design a series of laboratory
hierarchies in which an owner, employee, and a manager repeatedly cooperate over a
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fixed number of periods. Our main goal is to examine whether granting reporting re-
sponsibility to managers has a purpose beyond eliciting information from managers.
In our main experimental treatment, managers can periodically report private infor-
mation to elicit cooperative behavior from owners and employees. Frictions arise over
managers’ incentives to withhold their information so they can extract wealth unde-
tected. However, periodically reporting private information to both the owner and the
employee may elicit more cooperative play over time and realize more socially efficient
outcomes. Our results show managers change how they use their reporting respon-
sibility over time and that it takes a certain kind of manager to use their reporting
responsibility to elicit more cooperative play from owners and employees.
In addition to our main experimental treatment, we design two additional experimental
treatments in which the manager carries no reporting responsibility and his or her infor-
mation is either readily available or unavailable to the owner and the employee. These
two additional experimental treatments enable us to disentangle different effects pro-
duced by managers’ reporting choices. Specifically, all three experimental treatments
facilitate the separation of information transferred by managers’ reporting choices and
the cooperative intentions communicated by managers’ reporting choices. We find that
granting managers reporting responsibility may have a purpose beyond eliciting infor-
mation from managers. When managers report to both owners and employees, they
not only increase social efficiency by credibly transferring information to those parties,
but they also increase social efficiency by communicating an intention to exhibit more
cooperative behavior in the future. Thus, it may be important managers carry respon-
sibility for reporting even if technological advancements facilitate the production and
distribution of their information at lower cost.
1.3. A Note on Laboratory Experiments
Although all three studies in this dissertation motivate the application of laboratory ex-
periments, it is relevant to discuss the choice for this empirical method on a meta-level.
Laboratory experiments improve our ability to infer causal relationships by eliciting de-
pendent variables and manipulating independent variables in a controlled environment
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(Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Bloomfield, Nelson, and Soltes, 2016). The lure of causality
that is characteristic of laboratory experiments has increased their popularity in ac-
counting research over the past decades. Another advantage of laboratory experiments
is that they excel at studying micro-level phenomena such as human decision-making
processes and behavior. These micro-level phenomena are much more difficult to ob-
serve using other empirical methods because these methods often rely on meso- and
macro-level data or data that do not elicit micro-level phenomena directly.
The studies in this dissertation benefit from laboratory experiments because they help
unveil the processes of how users adjust and change how they use of management
accounting systems and help conduct causal tests. Individually, each laboratory ex-
periment also adopts a specific (and sometimes off-mainstream) experimental design
to answer their respective research questions. For example, the laboratory experiment
in the third chapter tests whether and how rotation policies impact how managers
report about operational distortions to performance measurement in their business
unit. Without the use of a laboratory experiment, it would have been difficult to get
high-quality, micro-level data on managers’ reporting decisions over time. Also, as
part of the experimental design, we manipulated whether managers rotated to another
business unit, and we randomly allocated manager-participants to the two resulting
conditions (i.e., the no rotation condition and the rotation condition). Manipulating
whether managers rotate business units helps mitigate reversed causality and lowers
the likelihood that other factors confound the observed relationship. The documented
causal effect of a rotation policy on managers’ reporting decisions is useful for firms
that are considering whether to implement such a policy.
All three laboratory experiments in this dissertation design a setting in which partici-
pants can earn money based on their decisions, random factors, and other participants’
decisions. They also use university students as participants. Like any other decision
about the design of laboratory experiments, the selection of the participant pool de-
pends on a study’s research goals and objectives (Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson, 2002;
Bloomfield et al., 2016). Some research goals demand a reasonable amount of sophis-
tication, know-how, and expertise from participants while other research goals deem
such characteristics unnecessary or undesirable. The three studies in this dissertation
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do not require participants to possess technical knowledge or vast amounts of practical
experience. The presence of a long-term career and specialized knowledge may even ob-
struct the pursuit of certain research goals. Specifically, experienced participants tend
to hold stronger beliefs about some topics of interest; controlling agents, reporting
about operational distortions in performance measurement, and multi-period report-
ing inside hierarchical settings. University students are unburdened by a long-term
career and a specific set of practical experiences. Yet they are likely to enter a full
time professional career in the near future. This unique profile makes them an appro-
priate participant pool to recruit from for studying fundamental questions about how
and why users adjust and change how they use management accounting systems.
1.4. Experimental Exhibits
Traditionally, laboratory experiments in accounting have predominantly focused on
testing relatively established, clear theoretical predictions (Bloomfield et al., 2016).
The laboratory experiments in chapter two and three also fall into this category.
In these laboratory experiments, theoretical mechanisms and constructs are estab-
lished clearly on before conducting the laboratory experiment, the experimental design
choices are justified based on the developed theory, and the analyses focus primarily on
testing the predicted theoretical mechanisms and providing evidence that alternative
explanations are unlikely to drive the results.
However, chapter four presents a different type of laboratory experiment, namely, an
experimental exhibit. Although experimental exhibits are less common in accounting,
they are used more extensively in economics. Sugden (2005) defines an experimental
exhibit as an experimental design that reliably induces some specific regularity (e.g.,
an effect or phenomenon) in human behavior. The regularity is captured by the exper-
imental design and is of interests because it cannot be adequately explained by some
received theory of human behavior. In many cases, the regularity is not surprising
when it is considered intuitively, rather than viewed through the lens of an existing
theory.
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The study in chapter four demonstrates that experimental exhibits can also be of
interest to accounting for two important reasons. First, since accounting research draws
on theories from multiple disciplines, such as economics, psychology, organizational
behavior, and finance, it can be challenging to formulate theoretical predictions that are
generally-accepted by a broad accounting audience. Also, when multiple theories from
different disciplines compete to explain human decision-making processes and behavior
in accounting settings, it is more challenging to justify experimental design choices
based on the predictions derived from one of these theories but not the others. An
experimental exhibit has the potential to pitch theories against one another and induce
a regularity that contravenes one theory while it can be explained by another.
Second, the study in chapter four also shows experimental exhibits can help accounting
researchers study decision-making processes and human behavior in more realistic but
complex accounting settings. Although accounting is an applied academic field in the
social sciences, the results obtained in laboratory experiments that test theoretical
predictions are often difficult to generalize to accounting settings in the naturally-
occurring world. This weakness of laboratory experiments is often referred to as a
lack of mundane realism (Aronson and Carlsmith, 1968). However, since the designs
of experimental exhibits are not justified based on a specific theoretical orientation
and focus on capturing a specific regularity in human behavior, they have to potential
to bring the results generated by the experimental exhibit a step closer to accounting
settings in the naturally-occurring world.
1.5. Outline of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter two, I present my
single-authored paper titled “Asymmetric Adjustment of Control.” In chapter three,
I present a study co-authored with Eddy Cardinaels and Bart Dierynck titled “Doing
What’s Right: The Impact of Rotation Policies on Managers’ Reports about Opera-
tional Distortions.” The last chapter is a study co-authored with Farah Arshad and
Bart Dierynck titled “Does Managerial Reporting Still Matter? An Experimental In-
vestigation of Laboratory Hierarchies.”
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Principals use controls, such as monitoring, incentives, sanctioning, and enforcement,
to motivate desired behavior. Much of our existing knowledge on how principals con-
trol agents originates from laboratory research that hold constant the economic costs
of controlling agents (e.g., Evans, Heiman-Hoffman, and Rau, 1994; Falk and Kosfeld,
2006; Cardinaels and Yin, 2015; Feichter, 2016; Cardinaels, Dierynck, Yin, and Beck-
ers, 2018). However, principals often enter new operating environments in which the
economic costs of controlling agents change. For instance, principals may learn that the
costs of the technology required to control agents have decreased (Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1976, 1995; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). In contrast, the efficiency loss commonly
associated with controlling agents (e.g., reduced agent flexibility) may be lower than
principals previously experienced (Walton, 1999; Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt, 2012).
Ideally, principals should incorporate changes to such costs (hereafter control costs)
and adjust their control over agents as soon as they become aware of it. Moreover,
principals should adjust their control over agents symmetrically; they should adjust
their control over agents to the same extent depending on whether they experience a
decrease or an increase in control costs.
In this study, I posit that principals adjust their control over agents asymmetrically
when control costs change. Principals may implement controls because they overesti-
mate the extent to which agents are self-interested (Miller and Ratner, 1998; Heath,
1999; Miller, 2001). I argue that principals develop these beliefs through experience
because controls tend to induce self-interested behavior by agents (Tenbrunsel and
Messick, 1999; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Christ, Sedatole, Towry, and Thomas, 2008;
Cardinaels and Yin, 2015). Consequently, principals are relatively reluctant to decrease
their control over agents when control costs increase because they have developed a
stronger belief that agents are self-interested. This belief causes principals to suppress
the information about increases in control costs because they conflict with their “re-
inforced” belief that agents are self-interested (Golman, Hagmann, and Loewenstein,
2017). However, principals are relatively likely to increase their control over agents
when control costs decrease because I do not expect that they have developed a strong
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belief that agents are not self-interested and do not need to be controlled. Principals
are, therefore, more likely to incorporate a decrease in control costs into a control
adjustment. Thus, my main hypothesis predicts that principals decrease their control
over agents less when control costs increase than they increase control when control
costs decrease.
To test my hypothesis, I conduct a laboratory experiment in which agents carry respon-
sibility for distributing wealth between their principal and themselves. Before agents
make the wealth distribution decision, principals can use an action control to direct
their agent’s decision (Ouchi, 1979; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2017). Specifically,
principals can set a minimum amount of wealth that their agent must allocate to
them, thereby, limiting their agent’s discretion over wealth distribution. However, ex-
ercising more control also imposes more control costs on the principal. My laboratory
experiment invites principals to balance granting the agent more discretion against the
control costs of directing the agent to give a higher minimum amount of wealth.
A key feature of my laboratory experiment is that principals experience a change in
control costs I randomly and anonymously rematch principal-agent dyads to interact
repeatedly for a known number of periods. In one of those periods, principals learn
about a change in control costs. About half of the principals experiences an increase in
control costs while the remainder experiences a decrease in control costs. If principals
do not adjust their control over agents asymmetrically depending on whether control
costs increase or decrease, then principals would increase their control over agents by
the same amount as they would decrease their control over agents after control costs
change. However, consistent with my hypothesis, the results reveal an asymmetric
adjustment pattern after principals’ control costs change: principals decrease their
control when control costs increase less than they increase their control when control
costs decrease. The asymmetry in principals’ control adjustments cause the average
control over agents to increase after the change in control costs while the average
control costs do not change.
In addition to manipulating whether principals experience a decrease or an increase in
control costs, I also vary when principals experience this change. Some principals expe-
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rience the change in control costs in earlier periods while others experience it in later
periods. This design feature effectively varies how strongly principals hold “sticky” be-
liefs that agents are self-interested (MacKinnon, Kisbu-Sakarya, and Gottschall, 2013).
That is, when principals experience an increase in control costs earlier, such beliefs have
less time to develop because they are less exposed to agents’ self-interested responses to
their control decisions. Principals should, therefore, be more responsive to the increase
in control costs. Consistent with this, I find that the asymmetric adjustment pattern
disappears when principals experience the change in control costs in earlier periods.
However, principals do exhibit asymmetric control adjustments when they experience
the change in control costs in later periods.
In supplemental analyses, I also examine principals’ tendencies to seek out informa-
tion that conflicts with “sticky” beliefs about self-interested agents after the change
in control costs. During the laboratory experiment, all participants have access to a
history table which presents everything that happened to them in the past, including
control cost realizations, principals’ control decisions, and agents’ responses. I mea-
sure how often principals access their historical records after the change in control
costs. Inspecting historical records after the change in control costs improves princi-
pals’ memory of interactions with agents (Basu, Dickhaut, Hecht, Towry, and Waymire,
2009) and could help principals who experience an increase in control costs revise their
“sticky” beliefs about self-interested agents after they experience the increase in con-
trol costs. Consistent with my theoretical predictions, however, I find principals have a
disproportionate tendency to avoid inspecting historical records after they experience
an increase in control costs.
This study makes several contributions to research and practice. First, it adds to the
control literature by increasing our understanding of how principals adjust controls.
A large body of experimental research has examined the consequences of control for
agent behavior (e.g., Coletti, Sedatole, and Towry, 2005; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Tayler
and Bloomfield, 2011; Christ, 2013; Garrett, Livingston, and Tayler, 2018). Although
there have been calls for more research on controls in dynamic environments (Birnberg,
1998), only a handful of laboratory experiments have examined principals’ control de-
cisions under such circumstances directly (e.g., Birnberg and Zhang, 2011; Cardinaels
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and Yin, 2015). We, therefore, know remarkably little about how principals adjust
control decisions they made in the past. My study extends this scant research stream
by documenting that principals adjust past control decisions asymmetrically depend-
ing on whether they experience an increase or a decrease in the economic costs of
controlling agents. This finding is important for organizations because principals may
at some point enter new operating environments in which economic circumstances are
different than they experienced before.
Second, this study also expands our knowledge of “sticky” economic phenomena. Stick-
iness is a general term referring to any economic variable that is resistant to change.
Stickiness has been documented in prices (Kehoe and Midrigan, 2015), wages (Elsby,
Shin, and Solon, 2016), costs (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman, 2003), and infor-
mation (Dupor, Kitamura, and Tsuruga, 2010; Knotek II, 2010). The results produced
by this study highlight a reason why controls may be sticky too. Indeed, it is frequently
echoed that the strength of controls in organizations has been increasing over time.
Frequently cited reasons are that regulation has become stricter, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 404, and that controlling agents has become cheaper due to advancements
in information technology and data science (e.g., Labro and Stice-Lawrence, 2018).
My results suggest principals themselves may have a strong hand in increasing the
strength of controls in organizations due to their “sticky” beliefs that agents are self-
interested.
Third, the results also have a bearing on the sources of “hardwired” beliefs about
the self-interested motives and behaviors of others. Prior research in psychology, for
instance, suggests individuals may hold general beliefs that other individuals behave in
a more self-interested fashion than they actually do (Miller and Ratner, 1998; Heath,
1999; Miller, 2001). This literature proposes that principals consistently overestimate
how much agents care about themselves and underestimate how much agents care
about doing something for others and the organization. In contrast to this literature,
my study suggests beliefs about the self-interested motives and behaviors of others
may not be static and that they are caused by the observations that individuals have
made in the past. In particular, exposure to self-interested behavior produces relatively
strong beliefs that cause individuals to suppress information that conflicts with these
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beliefs, which is consistent which psychological notions such as belief perseverance
(Anderson, 2007) and conceptual conservatism (Nissani, 1990).
Lastly, this study also offers a cautionary note for practitioners, in that exercising
more control elicits more self-interested responses from agents. Therefore, given the
asymmetry in principals’ control adjustments, principals may get stuck in a control-
ling mode where the development of “sticky” beliefs not only causes them to maintain
their control over agents, but also observe even more self-interested agent behavior,
reinforcing their “sticky” beliefs that agents are self-interested. Furthermore, my data
reveal that principals’ asymmetric control adjustments have negative economic conse-
quences for agents because their welfare, on average, drops as principals adjust their
control after the change in control costs. If organizations and institutions wish to tackle
these undesirable consequences of principals’ adjustment behavior, it may be mean-
ingful to keep them from developing “sticky” beliefs about self-interested agents. It
may be worthwhile not to expose principals to operating environments that warrant
high levels of control for too long. Frequent rotation schedules, for instance, may help
attenuate the development of “sticky” beliefs about self-interested agents because ex-
posing principals only briefly to different operational environments restricts the time
for such beliefs to form.
2.2. Theory and Hypothesis Development
2.2.1. Related literature
Principals possess responsibility over the design of controls, such as audits, enforce-
ment, and incentives, to limit agent discretion and induce desired behavior onto agents
(e.g., Coletti et al., 2005; Tayler and Bloomfield, 2011; Cardinaels and Yin, 2015;
Douthit and Stevens, 2015). A large body of the control literature in economics, psy-
chology, and accounting focuses on the consequences of controls for agent behavior.
For instance, some research suggests controls may entail “hidden costs” for principals
because agents may perceive the use of controls as a signal of distrust and a restriction
to their autonomy (e.g., Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Christ
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et al., 2008; Bartling et al., 2012). Prior research also examines the effects of controls
on agent behavior in the presence of other agents and with the passage of time (e.g.,
Coletti et al., 2005; Tayler and Bloomfield, 2011; Maas and Van Rinsum, 2013; Garrett
et al., 2018).
Some studies also incorporate the effects of a principal’s active role in making deci-
sions about controls. Yet relatively few focus directly on generating insights about
how principals make control decisions. Evans et al. (1994), for instance, design a lab-
oratory experiment in which principals choose between restricting agent discretion,
which has a lower expected payoff, and enlarging agent discretion, which has a higher
expected payoff. They find some principals prefer to restrict agent discretion even if
that decision results in a lower payoff. More recent laboratory experiments examine
how the principal’s prior experience with the agent’s task influences their control de-
cisions (e.g., Feichter, 2016; Cardinaels et al., 2018). For instance, Cardinaels et al.
(2018) find principals with task-experience are more likely to offer a fixed-wage rather
than incentive pay because they better understand that the task can be intrinsically
motivating than principals who do not possess task-specific experience. Although prior
laboratory research has started exploring how principals’ control decisions may vary,
we still know relatively little about how principals revise control decisions they made
in the past.
2.2.2. Hypothesis Development
In this study, I focus on how principals reassess their use of action controls (Ouchi,
1979; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2017). Principals typically use action controls to
direct agent behavior by limiting agent discretion and enforcing minimum standards
(e.g., Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Bartling et al., 2012). Implementing action controls
typically imposes direct costs on principals who bear responsibility for it (hereafter
control costs). For instance, control costs can capture the use of the technology that is
required to direct agent behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 1995; Falk and Kosfeld,
2006). Another interpretation is that they capture the loss in efficiency associated
with limiting agent discretion (Bartling et al., 2012). That is, limiting agent discretion
restricts agents’ ability to work flexibly and react in an efficient way to unanticipated
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situations (Walton, 1999). When principals make control decisions, they balance the
economic benefits of controlling agents with the economic benefits of trusting agents.
Since control costs decrease the expected economic benefits of controlling agents, higher
control costs cause principals to exercise less control over agents.
When principals enter new operating environments, they often experience a change
in control costs, which warrants an adjustment to their past control decisions. For
instance, principals may learn the costs for the technology required to direct agent
behavior have changed. It may be cheaper to direct agent behavior due to improved
technology, or the required technology may be more expensive due to the increasing
complexity of the agents’ operating environment. Alternatively, principals may learn
the efficiency loss associated with limiting agent discretion is different than they ex-
perienced in the past. The agents’ operating environment may become less volatile,
decreasing the efficiency-related costs of controlling agents. In contrast, the agents’
operating environment may also require agents to be more flexible than before which
should increase the efficiency-related costs of controlling agents. Importantly, when
principals learn control costs have changed, they should adjust the control decisions
that they have made in the past in a symmetric way. That is, they should adjust
their control over agents to the same extent depending on whether they experience a
decrease or an increase in control costs.
There are good reasons to expect, however, that principals may be reluctant to ad-
just some of the control decisions they made in the past. Psychology and behavioral
economics propose, for instance, that individuals have a disproportionate tendency to
stick to the current state of affairs. Individuals take the status quo as a reference point,
and any deviation is perceived as a loss (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991). Related to this phenomenon is the default effect which
revolves around individuals’ tendencies to choose defaults over alternative courses of
action (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Gigerenzer, 2008).
One of the most influential theories put forward to explain individuals’ reluctance
to change past decisions is (cumulative) prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). One of its main components is that individu-
als prefer avoiding losses to acquiring equivalent gains. If principals value controlling
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agents beyond its instrumental value (Evans et al., 1994; Birnberg, Hoffman, and Yuen,
2008), they may prefer maintaining their control over agents to acquiring control over
agents.
But what could the underlying causes be for this asymmetry in principals’ control
adjustments? I propose that an important reason is that principals observe different
agent behavior based on how strongly they controlled agents in the past. Prior litera-
ture suggests controls can induce self-interested behavior among agents. For instance,
being controlled causes agents to feel they are treated unfairly, and may behave recipro-
cally in response (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness
and Rabin, 2002). Agents may act in a more self-interested way in response to more
control because it implicitly signals more distrust or that the principal expects more
self-interested behavior from agents (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999; Falk and Kosfeld,
2006; Christ et al., 2008; Bartling et al., 2012; Cardinaels and Yin, 2015). Principals
who experience an increase in control costs are more likely to have exercised more
control over agents in the past and, as a result, have observed more self-interested
agent behavior than principals who experience a decrease in control costs.
When principals observe more self-interested agent behavior, I propose they develop a
“sticky” belief that agents are self-interested. Prior research in management and psy-
chology suggests, for instance, that individuals overestimate the self-interested motives
and behavior others and underestimate others’ socially interested motives and behav-
ior (Miller and Ratner, 1998; Heath, 1999; Miller, 2001). Psychologists, going back to
Festinger (1957), have also recognized that individuals dislike exposure to information
that conflicts with “hardwired” beliefs, and that they may choose to maintain those
beliefs despite obtaining new information that suggests acting against these beliefs
(Golman et al., 2017). Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as belief perseverance
(Anderson, 2007) and conceptual conservatism (Nissani, 1990).
Jointly, this suggests principals will adjust their control over agents differently de-
pending on the direction of the change in control costs. When control costs increase,
which is information that should induce principals to decrease control, principals may
suppress this information more strongly because it conflicts with their “sticky” beliefs
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about self-interested agents. In contrast, when control costs decrease, which is informa-
tion that should induce principals to increase control, principals may incorporate this
information into a control adjustment more strongly because their hold fewer “sticky”
beliefs about self-interested agents. Therefore, I predict principals will adjust their
control over agents less when controlling agents becomes more expensive than when
controlling agents becomes cheaper. This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis: Principals decrease control over agents less when control costs increase
than they increase control over agents when control costs decrease.
2.3. Experimental Design
2.3.1. Experimental Setting
To test my hypothesis, I develop a laboratory experiment in which participants interact
with each other for 12 periods. Participants are randomly assigned the role of principal
(she) or agent (he), and they remain in the same role throughout the 12 periods. At
the beginning of each period, participants are assigned new partners. Each period
consists of the same procedure; the principal can use an action control to direct their
agent’s decision to distribute 20 points (Ouchi, 1979; Merchant and Van der Stede,
2017). Specifically, principals choose how many out of 20 points their agent must give
to them. When the principal exercises full control, the agent must give 15 points to the
principal while keeping 5 points to himself. When the principal exercises no control,
the agent can distribute the 20 points any way he would like, but he must allocate at
least 5 points and at most 15 points to each party. Although full control eliminates
the agent’s opportunity to keep more than 5 points to himself, it also imposes a direct
economic cost on the principal (i.e., control costs).
— Table 1 about here —
Table 1 displays the principal’s and the agent’s payoffs in a period. When the principal
exercises full control (a = 1.00), the agent must give 15 out of the 20 points to the
principal and keep 5 points for himself, and the principal incurs control costs c. When
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the principal exercises no control (a = 0.00), the agent can distribute all 20 points
by allocating b1 points to the principal and b2 points to himself, and the principal
incurs no control costs. Prior experimental research typically forces principals to choose
between two polar states such as these, e.g., control versus no control (e.g., Evans
et al., 1994; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Bartling et al., 2012; Cardinaels and Yin, 2015)).
In my laboratory experiment, however, the principal cannot just choose between full
control (a = 1.00) and no control (a = 0.00). Instead, she can calibrate the level of
control carefully by choosing a along a continuum ranging from 0.00 to 1.00. Depending
on her level of control over the agent, the principal incurs control costs a · c, and
directs the agent to give her a · 15 points while keeping a · 5 points for himself. Under
such circumstances, the agent can still distribute the remaining (1− a) · 20 points by
allocating (1− a) · b1 points to the principal and (1− a) · b2 points to himself.
Calibrating the level of control (a) is a non-trivial task. Exercising more control means
the agent must give more points to the principal while keeping fewer points for himself
(i.e., a · 15 and a · 5 are increasing in a) and reduces the agent’s discretion over the
distribution of the 20 points (i.e., (1− a) · 20 is decreasing in a). However, exercising
more control also means the principal incurs more control costs (i.e., a · c is increasing
in a). Thus, when control costs are lower, it becomes more economically attractive
for the principal to exercise more control over the agent. However, when control costs
are higher, the principal may want to consider trusting the agent by granting more
discretion over distributing the 20 points. That is, if both control costs and concerns for
reciprocity are sufficiently high, principals and agents may both benefit from having the
agent distribute the 20 points (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995; Fehr, Gächter,
and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Kuang and Moser, 2009).
Principals and agents do not have to make payoff calculations themselves because the
software automatically updates the payoff functions while principals and agents are
making their decisions. Next to observing each other’s payoffs, agents also observe the
principal’s control decision a before making a decision about allocating (1 − a) · b1
points to the principal and (1 − a) · b2 points to himself. Principals and agents also
observe control costs c before they make their decisions. Thus, agents are not näıve
about the technology required to exercise control and the efficiency loss associated
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with control. This assumption helps elicit principals’ control decisions better because
prior research suggests that agents not only respond to principals’ control decisions
but also put those control decisions in perspective given the situation at hand (e.g.,
Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Christ, 2013). Also, if agents are oblivious to the situation in
which control decisions are made, it is more difficult for principals to develop beliefs
about the motivations and behavior of agents under different circumstances.
2.3.2. Experimental Manipulations
2.3.2.1. Experimental Treatments
The main manipulation in my laboratory experiment is that principals experience a
change in control costs. In the High-to-Low Treatment, control costs are high (c = 9)
before principals experience the change and low (c = 1) after principals experience the
change. In the Low-to-High Treatment, control costs are low (c = 1) before principals
experience the change and high (c = 9) after principals experience the change. I
keep the absolute impact of the change in control costs constant across treatments by
imposing that the increase in control costs, i.e., 8 points, equals the additive inverse of
the decrease in control costs (−8 points). If low control costs equal 0, then principals
have nothing to gain from trusting even the most socially-interested agent that always
chooses (b1 = 15, b2 = 5). Setting high control costs at 9 points ensures principals do
not strictly prefer trusting over controlling the most self-interested agent (i.e., c < 10).
If high control costs equal 10 points or more, then principals have nothing to gain from
controlling even the most self-interested agent who always chooses (b1 = 5, b2 = 15).
Therefore, if control cost realizations do not satisfy this range (i.e., c ∈ [1, 9]), then
there is no tension in principals’ control costs decisions. However, if control costs lie
within this range, then principals must carefully balance control costs with the degree
to which agents’ respond in a self-interested versus socially-interested way.
— Figure 1 about here —
If principals adjust their control over agents symmetrically after they experience the
change in control costs, then they would decrease their control over agents when control
costs increase to the same degree as they would increase their control over agents when
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control costs decrease. However, if the theory underlying my hypothesis holds, then
principals will decrease their control over agents less than they will increase their
control over agents when control costs change.
2.3.2.2. Timing of the Change in Control Costs
In addition to manipulating the direction of the change in control costs, I also vary
when principals experience this change. Specifically, the period in which principals
experience the change in control costs, period t̂, varies from period 4 to period 10.
Therefore, principals always have a minimum pre-change and post-change stage of
three periods. This extension to my design is coined a “blockage” design (MacKinnon
et al., 2013) and helps find indirect support for my underlying theory. When the change
in control costs happens in earlier periods, principals have a shorter pre-change stage
and a longer post-change stage. A shorter pre-change stage gives principals less time to
develop “sticky” beliefs that agents are self-interested before experiencing an increase
in control costs. According to my theory, experiencing the change in control costs
earlier should, therefore, attenuate the asymmetry in principals’ control adjustments.
Figure 2 presents an overview of this manipulation.
— Figure 2 about here —
The design decision to vary the timing of the change in control costs also has inter-
nal validity benefits. If agents can directly observe the change in control costs and
if principals consider that agents can observe this information, then principals will
adapt their adjustment behavior. Since this would reflect a different setting in which
principals do not change agents, it would lead to a less valid test of my theory which
does not include the anticipatory behavior of principals on how agents incorporate
changes in control costs and their reaction to this change in control costs. Together
with the random-matching procedure, varying the timing of the change in control costs
helps prevent that agents directly observe the change in control costs, and, therefore,
that principals consider how agents respond to the change in control costs and their
adjustment behavior. Specifically, agents are periodically and randomly matched to
principals who may or may not have experienced a change in control costs. Similarly,
principals are periodically and randomly matched to agents who have either been ex-
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posed to principals with low or high control costs. Varying the timing of the change
in control costs, therefore, helps increase my confidence that principals’ control ad-
justments can be directly attributed to the change in control costs that principals
experience and not to principals’ considerations about how agents respond to control
decisions that principals’ have made in the past.
2.3.3. Experimental Procedures
I used oTree to program the software for the laboratory experiment (Chen, Schonger,
and Wickens, 2016). oTree is a python-based, open-source software platform for sur-
vey and experimental research. I used oTree for my laboratory experiment because it
enabled me to give participants real-time feedback on the consequences of potential
decisions for their and their partner’s payoffs. Appendix 2.5 displays a few screenshots,
and a simplified, one-period version of the laboratory experiment can be tested here.
I conducted the laboratory experiment at the research institute for economics and
management of a Western-European university. Before conducting the laboratory ex-
periment, I obtained approval, including the evaluation of my research proposal, from
the research institute. Anyone conducting research in the laboratory of the research in-
stitute must not deceive participants, present information that is true as it is written or
said, pay participants as promised, and keep participants’ identity confidential.
Throughout the laboratory experiment, participants have access to historical records
of what happened to them in the past. Whenever participants make decisions, they can
click on a button to review those historical records. Their historical records contain
information about control costs that principals faced, the principal’s control decision,
payoffs, and, if applicable, the agent’s response to the principal’s control decision. Be-
fore the laboratory experiment, participants also receive instructions with quiz ques-
tions, and both principals and agents learn control costs cannot be lower than 1 point
nor higher than 9 points. Although control costs are periodically observable to prin-
cipals and agents before they make decisions, I do not explicitly disclose, before the
laboratory experiment, the sequence of control cost realizations and the period in which
principals experience the change in control costs to principals and agents. Providing
principals and agents with this information beforehand would lead to anticipatory be-
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havior, thereby mitigating and contaminating the effect of the change on principal
behavior after principals experience the change in period t̂.
2.4. Results
2.4.1. Participants
I recruited a total of 200 business and economics students to participate in the labora-
tory experiment. University students are an appropriate participant pool for my study
because their profile fits well with the relatively abstract setting in my laboratory ex-
periment (Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson, 2002). University students are an intelligent
cross-section of society and unburdened by a long-term career. These participants char-
acteristics are useful for my study because they lower the likelihood that participants
hold strong opinions about how principals use action controls to direct agent behavior
and limit agent discretion depending on their practical experience.
The laboratory experiment lasted about 45 minutes, and the number of participants
in each experimental session ranged from 20 to 24 and was always a multiple of two.
As a show-up incentive, participants received a modest amount of course credit (up
to 5 percent of their total grade depending on their educational track). In addition
to this show-up incentive, participants earned money based on how many points they
earned during the laboratory experiment. Specifically, I paid e0.60 for every 10 points.
Payout realizations range from e4.00 to e11.99 with an average rate of e6.60 for 45
minutes (an average of e8.80 per hour). Out of the 200 participants that participated, I
excluded nine principal-participants from the final sample because they failed the com-
prehension checks in the ex-post questionnaire. Specifically, nine principal-participants
provided a wrong answer to one or more of the following statements: “In each period,
I chose the value for a.”, “I was Player 2.”, and “In each period, I chose the values
for b1 and b2.”.
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2.4.2. Descriptive Statistics
The 91 principal-participants generated a total of 1, 092 principal-period observations;
Table 2 and Table 3 present the descriptive results for the Low-to-High Treatment and
the High-to-Low Treatment, respectively. Conventional economic theory predicts prin-
cipals exercise full control over agents who realize their most favorable (their principal’s
least favorable) point distribution when given the opportunity. However, descriptive
results show principals exercise less than full control over agents fifty-five percent of the
time (599 out of 1, 092 panel observations), which enables agents to exercise discretion
over how points are distributed. I measure how strongly agents use their discretion to
contribute to the principal’s payoff as agent Contribution, which equals (b1 − 5)/10
and lies between zero and one. The descriptive results in Table 2 and Table 3 again
refute conventional economic predictions by showing agents do not use their discretion
strictly in a self-interested manner.
— Table 2 and Table 3 about here —
Both tables also provide support for some of the assumptions underlying my theory.
First, principals exercise more control over agents when control costs are low as opposed
to high (pre-change test: Z = 5.230, two-tailed p-value < 0.001; post-change test: Z =
5.464, two-tailed p-value < 0.001). Second, agents also respond in a more self-interested
way to higher levels of control than to lower levels of control. Specifically, when control
costs are low and principals exercise more control, agent Contribution is lower than
when control costs are high, and principals exercise less control (pre-change test: Z =
−3.035, two-tailed p-value = 0.002; post-change test: Z = −2.353, two-tailed p-value
< 0.019).
Control costs and participants’ decisions also generate variation in participants’ pay-
offs. Payoff Principal is higher when control costs are low as opposed to high, and this
difference is statistically significant (pre-change test: Z = 19.112, two-tailed p-value
< 0.001; post-change test: Z = 19.205, two-tailed p-value < 0.001). Payoff Agent,
however, is higher when control costs are high as opposed to low (pre-change test: Z
= 4.719, two-tailed p-value < 0.001; post-change test: Z = 5.176, two-tailed p-value
< 0.001). Control costs, therefore, lead to payoff benefits for principals when they are
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low rather than high and to payoff benefits for agents when they are high rather than
low. Also, Total Payoffs are higher when control costs are low as opposed to high (pre-
change test: Z = 15.175, two-tailed p-value < 0.001; post-change test: Z = 16.053,
two-tailed p-value < 0.001), suggesting the payoff benefits enjoyed by principals under
low control costs are higher than the payoff benefits enjoyed by agents under high
control costs. Lastly, Tables 2 and 3 also reveal the difference between principals’ and
agents’ period payoffs is higher when control costs are low as opposed to high (pre-
change test: Z = 12.512, two-tailed p-value < 0.001; post-change test: Z = 15.791,
two-tailed p-value < 0.001).
— Figure 3 about here —
Table 2 and Table 3 also show principals adjust their control over agents differently
depending on whether they experience an increase or decrease in control costs. Table
2 presents no evidence that principals decrease control over agents in the Low-to-
High Treatment after control costs increase (two-tailed p-value > 0.100). Yet Table 3
does reveal principals increase control over agents in the High-to-Low Treatment after
control costs decrease (Z = 8.716, two-tailed p-value < 0.001). These two effects cause
the average level of control to increase from 0.721 to 0.808 after the change in control
costs (Z = 5.779, two-tailed p-value < 0.001). To visualize this asymmetric adjustment
pattern, Figure 3 plots the average control principals exercise over agents for each of
the two experimental treatments (Low-to-High Treatment and High-to-Low Treatment)
crossed with the two stages (pre-change stage and post-change stage). while principals
increase control over agents when control costs decrease, Figure 3 presents no clear
evidence that they decrease control over agents when control costs increase. Descriptive
statistics and Figure 3 thus provide preliminary evidence that principals adjust their
control over agents asymmetrically after experiencing the change in control costs.
2.4.3. Hypothesis Test
In this section, I present a formal test of my hypothesis which predicts principals de-
crease their control over agents when control costs increase less than they increase
their control over agents when control costs decrease. To test this hypothesis, I use
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions in Stata 15 with robust standard errors. The
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dependent variable is Control Adjustment, which equals the change in average control
exercised by principals before and after the change in control costs, and I test whether
its value is different across the Low-to-High Treatment and the High-to-Low Treat-
ment. Since the dependent variable is a change variable, I use the empirical approach
discussed by Allison (1990) and van Breukelen (2013). The results in Table 4 column
1 reveal principals’ control adjustments equal 0.212 in the High-to-Low Treatment
(two-tailed p < 0.001). I estimate principals’ control adjustments in the Low-to-High
Treatment by calculating the following linear combinations of coefficients in Stata 15:
lincom Constant + Low-to-High Treatment. I find principals’ control adjustments in
the Low-to-High Treatment equal −0.075 (two-tailed p = 0.067).
— Table 4 about here —
To test whether principals’ control adjustments differ across experimental treatments,
I estimate an asymmetry coefficient by subtracting the inverse of the estimated control
adjustment in the Low-to-High Treatment (i.e., 0.212 − 0.287 = 0.075) from the esti-
mated control adjustment in the High-to-Low Treatment (i.e., 0.212). If the asymmetry
coefficient is larger than zero, then the data reveals a distinct asymmetric adjustment
pattern in the predicted direction. Table 4 column 1 presents evidence for a positive
and significant asymmetry coefficient providing support for my hypothesis (β = 0.137,
two-tailed p-value = 0.017). Principals, therefore, adjust their control over agents less
when they experience an increase in control costs than when they experience a decrease
in control costs.1
2.4.4. Timing of the Change in Control Costs
While Table 4 column 1 shows principals adjust their control over agents asymmet-
rically, some control adjustments may be more symmetric than others. Next to ma-
nipulating the direction of the change in control costs, I also varied the period in
which principals experience the change in control costs. When principals experience
the change in control costs earlier, they have a longer post-change and a shorter pre-
1 I also estimated factional probit panel regressions predicting principals’ level of control over time
according to the approach suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (2008). Since my inferences are
qualitatively similar, I use OLS regressions predicting Control Adjustment instead because it
facilitates the most direct test for my hypothesis.
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change stage. According to my theory, experiencing the increase control costs earlier
should make principals’ beliefs about self-interested agents less “sticky” because prin-
cipals make fewer observations about self-interested behavior when control costs are
initially low. Experiencing the change in control costs earlier rather than later should,
therefore, attenuate, at least part of, the asymmetry in their control adjustments.
To examine whether experiencing the change in control costs earlier attenuates the
asymmetry in principals’ control adjustments, I split principals into two relatively
equal groups. Earlier Changes comprises 50 principals who learned about the change
to control costs in period 4, period 5, period 6, or period 7 and Later Changes are 41
principals who learned about the change to control cost in period 8, period 9, or period
10. My inferences are qualitatively similar if I use period 7 as the starting period for
Later Changes.2 Table 4 columns 2 and 3 split the OLS regression in column 1 by earlier
changes (column 2) and later changes (column 3). Results reveal principals’ asymmetric
control adjustments are located with principals who experienced the change in control
costs later rather than earlier. That is, principals adjust their control less in the Low-
to-High Treatment than in the High-to-Low Treatment for later changes in control costs
in column 3 (asymmetry coefficient: β = 0.242, two-tailed p-value < 0.001). However,
I find no evidence that principals adjust their control differently when they experience
the change in control costs earlier (asymmetry coefficient: two-tailed p-value > 0.100).
These results provide indirect support for my theory that “sticky” beliefs about self-
interested agents are the driver behind the asymmetric adjustment pattern observed
in the data.
2.4.5. Supplemental Analyses
2.4.5.1. Avoiding Conflicting Information
In this section, I further explore the working assumption that principals have a ten-
dency to seek out information that confirms beliefs and avoid information that con-
tradicts their beliefs (Hart, Albarraćın, Eagly, Brechan, Lindberg, and Merrill, 2009;
Sullivan, 2009). Recall that participants can also press a button to access historical
2 I cannot use a continuous measure for the timing of the change in control costs because I do not
have enough principals for each period in which the change in control costs takes place.
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records of what happened to them in the past. They contain information about control
costs that principals faced, the principal’s control decision, payoffs, and, if applicable,
the agent’s response to the principal’s control decision. Figure 4 plots the likelihood
of inspecting historical records across experimental treatments and the two stages in
the laboratory experiment.
— Figure 4 about here —
Before the change in control costs, principals inspect historical records more when they
face high control costs compared to when they face low control costs (Z = 2.053, two-
tailed p-value = 0.040). Principals who face high control costs must consider agents’
responses more strongly to calibrate their control over agents. Keeping track of how
agents’ respond to their control decisions helps improve their control decisions. In con-
trast, principals who face low control costs can consider agents’ responses less when
calibrating their control over agents. My theory also proposes that the last group of
principals develop “sticky” beliefs that agents are self-interested. If my theory holds,
then this group of principals should be less willing to inspect historical records after
experiencing an increase in control costs because this information should contradict
their “sticky” beliefs that agents are self-interested. Consistent with this notion, Figure
4 reveals no evidence of a difference in the likelihood of inspecting historical records
after the change in control costs (two-tailed p-value > 0.100). As expected, principals
who experienced a decrease in control costs lower their inspection behavior because
they do not have to consider agents’ responses as strongly as they did before the
change in control costs (Z = −1.797, two-tailed p-value = 0.072). However, principals
who experienced an increase in control costs do not appear to increase their inspec-
tion behavior (two-tailed p-value > 0.100), which is consistent with the notion that
individuals prefer to avoid information that contradicts their beliefs.
2.4.5.2. Seeking Conflicting Information
Throughout this paper, I have assumed that principals have tendencies to avoid con-
flicting information and seek out confirming information. Although the last findings
suggest this is a general assumption that is valid, on average, principals may also vary
in their tendency to avoid information that conflicts with their beliefs. To identify
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principals who seek out conflicting information more strongly, I split principals into
two groups using a median split: High History Inspection and Low History Inspection.
The first group of principals have a relatively high inclination to seek out historical
information after the change in control costs across the two experimental treatments.
I expect the asymmetry in their control adjustments will be attenuated because prin-
cipals who experience a decrease in control costs keep taking into account agents’
responses although the need for it is much lower. Such behavior on the part of this
group of principals decreases the development of “sticky” beliefs after experiencing a
decrease in control costs. In contrast, the principals who experience an increase in con-
trol costs and have a high inclination to seek out historical information should revise
their “sticky” beliefs about self-interested agents (developed before experiencing the
increase in control costs) more strongly. In sum, the asymmetric adjustment pattern
should be attenuated for principals who have a relatively strong tendency to inspect
historical records after the change in control costs.
— Table 5 about here —
I re-estimate the OLS regression presented in Table 4 column 1 for each of the two
subgroups of principals. Table 5 presents these two columns: Low History Inspection
(column 1), High History Inspection (column 2). Column 2 presents no evidence for the
asymmetric adjustment of control among principals who are highly inclined to inspect
historical records (asymmetry coefficient: two-tailed p-value > 0.100). However, I do
find principals who are weakly inclined to inspect historical records exhibit asymmetric
control adjustments in column 1 (asymmetry coefficient: β = 0.154, two-tailed p-value
= 0.054). In sum, Table 5 shows the asymmetric adjustment pattern disappears when
principals have a higher tendency to seek out information contradicting their “sticky”
beliefs after the change in control costs.
2.4.5.3. Changes in Payoffs
In this section, I examine whether principals’ asymmetric control adjustments have
consequences for how payoffs change. I calculate the change in payoffs by subtracting
the average payoffs after principals experience the change in control costs from the
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average payoffs before principals experience the change in control costs.3 I consider
three different dependent variables; one for the principal (principal Payoff Change), one
for the agent (agent Payoff Change), and one for total payoffs (Total Payoff Change).
The main independent variable of interest is (Low-to-High Treatment) which equals
one for the Low-to-High Treatment and zero for the High-to-Low Treatment. I estimate
three Ordinary Least Squares regressions, one for each dependent variable, with robust
standard errors, and the results are presented in Table 5.
Table 5 column 1 shows no evidence that the asymmetry in principals’ adjustment
behavior influences how principals’ payoffs change Low-to-High Treatment (asymme-
try coefficient: two-tailed p-value > 0.100). However, column 2 reveals the increase
in agents’ payoffs is lower in the Low-to-High Treatment than the decrease in agents’
payoffs in the High-to-Low Treatment (asymmetry coefficient: β = −0.942, two-tailed
p-value = 0.060). Thus, principals’ asymmetric control adjustments have negative con-
sequences for how agents’ payoffs change. Column 3 shows the change in total payoffs is
also not consistent across experimental treatments. Specifically, total payoffs decrease
more in the Low-to-High Treatment than they increase in the High-to-Low Treatment
(β = 0.972, two-tailed p-value = 0.017). This is consistent with the asymmetry ob-
served for the change in agents payoffs in column 2.
— Table 6 about here —
2.5. Discussion
This study presents experimental evidence that principals adjust their control over
agents less when they experience an increase in control costs than when they expe-
rience a decrease in control costs. Principals exhibit this asymmetry in their control
adjustments because they develop “sticky” beliefs about self-interested agents over
time. When principals experienced lower control costs in the past, they observed more
self-interested agent behavior than principals who experienced higher control costs in
the past. Observing self-interested agent behavior leads to the development of “sticky”
3 Like my main analyses, inferences remain qualitatively similar when I use fractional response
panel regressions (Papke and Wooldridge, 2008).
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beliefs about self-interested agents and cause principals to suppress information about
an increase in control costs while they seek out historical information about agent
behavior that confirms their beliefs. This leads principals to adjust their control asym-
metrically when experiencing a change in control costs. I also find the asymmetric
adjustment pattern disappears when principals have less time to develop “sticky” be-
liefs that agents are self-interested.
My study impacts our knowledge of how principals deal with agent authority and
implement controls. Prior research in experimental economics and accounting have
mostly examined delegation decisions (e.g., Schotter, Zheng, and Snyder, 2000; Ham-
man, Loewenstein, and Weber, 2010; Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening, 2013; Bartling, Fehr,
and Herz, 2014) and control decisions separately (e.g., Evans et al., 1994; Birnberg
et al., 2008; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Bartling et al., 2012). This study focuses on elic-
iting principals’ control decisions assuming that authority has already been delegated
to agents. However, since delegation decisions and control decisions are typically made
simultaneously (Jensen and Meckling, 1995), it may be meaningful to elicit them simul-
taneously in the laboratory and examine whether principals who carry responsibility
for these decisions behave as predicted by generally-accepted theories on the design
of organizational structure (Brickley, Clifford, and Zimmerman, 1995; Zimmerman,
2016).
In my laboratory experiment, agents do not directly observe the change in control costs
that principals experience and how principals react to this new operating environment
compared to the previous one. I designed my laboratory experiment in this way to en-
sure principals’ control adjustments can be directly attributed to the change in control
costs that they experience and not to their consideration of how agents may perceive
their control adjustment or the change in control costs. Prior research has studied
agents’ responses to changing externally imposed controls extensively (e.g., Coletti
et al., 2005; Tayler and Bloomfield, 2011; Garrett et al., 2018), and they have also ex-
amined how agents respond to principals’ involvement in deciding whether to switch to
the use of controls or not (Cardinaels and Yin, 2015). Although such insights are mean-
ingful additions to the literature, some research suggests organizational changes and
changes to modes of employment are typically accompanied by agent turnover (e.g.,
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Baron, Hannan, and Burton, 2001; Morrell, LoanClarke, and Wilkinson, 2004). Even if
organizations do not change agents under such circumstances, agents themselves often
look for job opportunities elsewhere when they feel they possess insufficient levels of
discretion over the situations they face (Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein, 2008). There-
fore, the design choice to not let agents be a part of the change in control costs and
principals’ control adjustments may still capture a relevant business scenario.
My laboratory experiment also does not speak to the prevalence and relevance of asym-
metric control adjustments in practice. Laboratory experiments typically score low on
mundane realism, which reflects the degree to which the materials and procedures
involved in a laboratory experiment are similar to events that occur in the naturally-
occurring world (Aronson and Carlshmith, 1968). In my laboratory experiment, I em-
pirically document asymmetric control adjustments can occur. Future research could
build on this laboratory evidence by examining whether asymmetric control adjust-
ments also occur in practice. Perhaps control asymmetric adjustments do not occur in
practice because organizations and institutions have found ways to address this issue.
Indeed, I present an instance in the laboratory experiment where principals do not
exhibit asymmetric control adjustments. This additional finding is helpful because it
provides support for my theory and highlights when the asymmetric adjustment of
control may be more and less prevalent in practice.
A promising avenue for future research may be to identify other forms of information
that impact principals’ adjustments to their control over agents in a non-trivial way.
In this study, I focus on changes to the cost of controlling agents which captures the
costs for the technology required to direct agent decision-making and the loss in effi-
ciency associated with limiting agent decision-making. Besides information about such
economic factors, there may be other important information that impacts principals’
control adjustments such as normative information, external consulting, and regula-
tory information. Empirical research suggests such information changes the nature and
type of accounting systems over time (Labro and Stice-Lawrence, 2018; Leiby, 2018).
It would be insightful to explore how such information changes how principals use
accounting systems to control agents.
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Figures
Fig. 2.1. Experimental Treatments
Fig. 2.2. Timing of the Change in Control Costs
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Fig. 2.3. Average Control across Experimental Treatments
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Fig. 2.4. History Inspection across Experimental Treatments
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Appendix A: Experimental Materials
In this appendix, I present a few screenshots of the first period of the laboratory
experiment. In this example, control costs equal 9 points, and there is no history table
because there is no history.
The Principal’s Decision
Before The Decision










Table 1: Principal and Agent Payoffs
Role Payoff
Principal a · (15 − c) + (1 − a) · b1
Agent a · 5 + (1 − a) · b2
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Low-to-High Treatment
Pre-change (Low Control Costs) Post-change (High Control Costs)
Mean S.d. Min Max N Mean S.d. Min Max N
Control 0.815 0.254 0.000 1.000 234 0.752 0.334 0.000 1.000 258
Employee Contribution 0.086 0.189 0.000 1.000 131 0.113 0.205 0.000 1.000 152
Payoff Manager 12.520 2.037 5.090 14.010 234 6.058 0.768 5.000 10.060 258
Payoff Employee 6.665 2.276 5.000 14.900 234 7.169 3.022 5.000 15.000 258
Total Payoffs 19.185 0.255 19.000 20.000 234 13.228 3.009 11.000 20.000 258
Payoff Difference 6.506 3.243 0.000 9.810 234 2.140 2.652 0.000 10.000 258
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - High-to-Low Treatment
Pre-change (High Control Costs) Post-change (Low Control Costs)
Mean S.d. Min Max N Mean S.d. Min Max N
Control 0.650 0.356 0.000 1.000 316 0.859 0.279 0.000 1.000 284
Employee Contribution 0.143 0.195 0.000 0.864 218 0.067 0.183 0.000 1.000 98
Payoff Manager 6.306 1.118 5.000 10.000 316 12.844 2.282 5.000 14.090 284
Payoff Employee 7.842 2.966 5.000 15.000 316 6.297 2.554 5.000 15.000 284
Total Payoffs 14.148 3.207 11.000 20.000 316 19.141 0.279 19.000 20.000 284
Payoff Difference 2.292 2.628 0.000 10.000 316 7.741 2.505 0.000 10.000 284
Table 2 and Table 3 display descriptive statistics split by treatment and by the periods before and after the change in con-
trol costs. Control is the level of control exercised by principals in a period ranging from 0.00 to 1.00. Agent Contribution
equals the agent’s contribution percentage to principal wealth in each period, i.e., (b1 − 5)/10. Payoff Principal and Payoff
Agent are the period payoffs of principals and agents, respectively. Total Payoffs is the sum of Payoff Principal and Payoff
Agent. Payoff Difference is the absolute difference between Payoff Principal and Payoff Agent.
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Table 4: OLS Regressions








Low-to-High Treatment -0.287*** -0.282*** -0.270***
(0.056) (0.089) (0.059)
Constant 0.212*** 0.168** 0.256***
(0.039) (0.066) (0.040)
Asymmetry Coefficient 0.137 0.054 0.242
— p-value 0.017 0.551 0.000
R2 0.225 0.172 0.335
Model Degrees of Freedom 1.000 1.000 1.000
F-statistic 26.135 9.969 20.875
— p-value 0.000 0.003 0.000
Observations 91 50 41
Table 4 reports the result of three Ordinary Least Squares regressions with robust standard errors in
parentheses; all p-values are two-tailed: * p < 0.100, ** p < 0.050, *** p < 0.010; the dependent variable
is Control Adjustment which equals the change in average control exercised by principals; the indepen-
dent variable of interest is Low-to-High Treatment which equals one for the Low-to-High Treatment and
zero for the High-to-Low Treatment ; column 1 reports the results for all changes in control costs, column
2 reports the results for earlier changes only (i.e., changes in control costs in period 7 or earlier), and
column 3 reports the results for later changes only (i.e., changes in control costs in period 8 or later).
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Table 5: OLS Regressions










Asymmetry Coefficient 0.154 0.102
— p-value 0.054 0.264
R2 0.209 0.237
Model Degrees of Freedom 1.000 1.000
F-statistic 13.909 8.875
— p-value 0.000 0.006
Observations 58 33
Table 5 reports the result of two Ordinary Least Squares regressions with robust standard errors in paren-
theses; all p-values are two-tailed: * p < 0.100, ** p < 0.050, *** p < 0.010; the dependent variable is
Control Adjustment which equals the change in average control exercised by principals; the independent
variable of interest is Low-to-High Treatment which equals one for the Low-to-High Treatment and zero
for the High-to-Low Treatment ; column 1 reports the results for principals who exhibited Low History
Inspection, and column 2 reports the results for principals with who exhibited High History Inspection. I
measure History Inspection as the extent to which principals inspect historical records after experiencing
the change in control costs.
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Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions








Low-to-High Treatment -13.184*** 2.196*** -10.989***
(0.365) (0.495) (0.454)
Constant 6.595*** -1.569*** 5.026***
(0.302) (0.325) (0.287)
Asymmetry Coefficient 0.005 -0.942 -0.937
— p-value 0.989 0.060 0.042
R2 0.930 0.183 0.870
Model Degrees of Freedom 1.000 1.000 1.000
F-statistic 1301.847 19.711 586.330
— p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 91 91 91
Table 6 presents the result of three Ordinary Least Squares regressions with robust standard errors in
parentheses; all p-values are two-tailed: * p < 0.100, ** p < 0.050, *** p < 0.010; the dependent variables
are Principal Payoff Change, which equals the change in average principal payoff, Agent Payoff Change,
which equals the change in average agent payoff, and Total Payoff Change, which equals the change in
average total payoff; the independent variable of interest is Low-to-High Treatment which equals one for




Doing What’s Right: The Impact of









Campbell’s Law (1979) is an adage stating that “the more any quantitative indicator
is used for decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and
the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to
monitor.” Applying Campbell’s Law to performance measurement in firms suggests
measuring performance and incentivizing performance can induce employees to under-
take actions that distort performance measure realizations (Holmström and Milgrom,
1991; Baker, 1992; Bloomfield, 2015). In the operational layers of the firm, for instance,
employees may undertake actions that advance measured performance more than true
performance, an activity coined “operational distortion.” Although guidance exists
on how firms can prevent employees from undertaking operational distortions (e.g.,
Choi, Hecht, and Tayler, 2012, 2013; Bentley, 2018), this study focuses on whether
and how their managers report about the operational distortions that they observe in
the operational layers of the firm.
When managers observe operational distortions, they are confronted with a difficult
choice: do they report those operational distortions so performance measurement sys-
tems can be improved, or do they keep this information to themselves so they can
benefit from it now and potentially in the future? If managers do not report their
observations to their superiors, operational distortions may continue to cause daily in-
efficiencies and obstruct the firm’s ability to track its strategic objectives. However, not
reporting operational distortions may also have more severe consequences. At Wells
Fargo, for instance, the mantra “eight is great” (employees should aim to get eight
products into the hands of every customer) led employees to create up to 3.5 million
fake bank accounts (Keller, 2017). At Volkswagen, engineers implemented a so-called
“defeat device” in their diesel cars which activated a mode that temporarily dropped
emission levels to comply with emission standards during testing (Ewing, 2018). In
both of these remarkable cases, managers knew or at some point became aware of the
operational distortions.
Eliciting information about operational distortions from managers could simply be a
matter of providing managers with the right economic incentives. For instance, firms
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can offer implicit rewards, such as discretionary pay, career opportunities, and job se-
curity, to incentivize managers to report about operational distortions to performance
measurement (Indjejikian and Matjka, 2012; Lazear and Oyer, 2012). However, we
argue that presenting managers with economic incentives may not always be the best
way to entice them to report about operational distortions. Instead, it can also be
meaningful to create circumstances in which managers do not to consider economic in-
centives and trade-offs. In this paper, we study how firms can instigate managers to “do
what’s right,” which is discovering the option to report about operational distortions
to do what is right for the firm and without the aim to benefit from it economically.
Specifically, we argue firms can induce managers to “do what’s right” by implementing
a policy that rotates managers periodically across business units.
We integrate research on decision-making and psychology into our pre-existing, mainly
economics-based, understanding of how rotation policies impact managerial reporting.
Prior economic models predict managers will attach less economic value to the op-
erational distortions in their business unit when they rotate across business units
compared to when they do not (Arya and Mittendorf, 2004; Prescott and Townsend,
2006). Specifically, rotation policies decrease the exploitation value of concealing op-
erational distortions in a business unit when managers expect to rotate out of their
business unit in the near future. Thus, rotation policies enable firms to elicit reports
about operational distortions from managers at a lower cost by offering fewer rewards
for the operational distortions that managers report. Since rotation policies decrease
both the exploitation value of concealing operational distortions and the reward value
of reporting those distortions equally, how managers balance the economic trade-off is
unaffected by rotation policies. Therefore, economic reasoning predicts that managers
would report about operational distortions they encounter in their business units to
the same degree under rotation and no rotation.
In contrast, we predict rotation policies increase the operational distortions that man-
agers report because they increase the likelihood that managers view their reporting
decision less as an economic decision and more as a decision that enables them to
“do what’s right” for the firm. Regardless of whether firms use a rotation policy, the
negative consequences of operational distortions in business units for firm welfare stay
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the same. However, by simultaneously lowering both the exploitation and reward value
of operational distortions in business units, rotation policies decrease the saliency of
resolving these two competing economic pursuits. When the economic trade-off un-
derlying the reporting decision is less salient, managers are more likely to shift to a
broader decision frame that includes the firm’s perspective (Larrick, 2009). In this
way, rotation policies increase managers’ awareness that alternative options exist (Mc-
Crae, 1987; Runco, 1991; Silvia, Winterstein, Willse, Barona, Cram, Hess, Martinez,
and Richard, 2008), such as reporting about operational distortions in their business
unit to do what is right for the firm rather than benefiting from it economically. Our
primary hypothesis is that rotation policies cause managers to report more of the op-
erational distortions they encounter in their business units than in the absence of a
rotation policy.
To test our hypothesis, we conduct a two-period laboratory experiment in which two
managers periodically and separately observe operational distortions to how their busi-
ness unit’s performance is measured, which they can exploit at the cost of the owner of
the firm. Both managers have the option to periodically report about the operational
distortions to the owner who, in turn, can reward managers for operational distortions
they report. Operational distortions are specific to business units and persistent across
the two periods. Only if a manager reports about all operational distortions in their
business unit to the owner, then those operational distortions are completely resolved
in the current and, if applicable, in the next period. We manipulate whether the two
managers rotate to each other’s business units in the second period. In the rotation
condition, managers rotate to each other’s business unit in the second period. In the
no rotation condition, managers stay in their business unit for two periods.
The results of our laboratory experiment support our hypothesis. At the end of the
second period, managers’ reports have resolved 12 percent more of the operational
distortions that their business units were subjected to in the rotation condition than
in the no rotation condition. Contrary to economic reasoning, we also find no evidence
that owners offer fewer total rewards for the total reports that managers produce
across the two periods. Across both periods, owners, therefore, do not economize on
the cost advantage of eliciting reports about operational distortions that rotation poli-
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cies provide. However, since business units are less exposed to operational distortions
over time under the rotation policy, owner welfare is about 8.4 percent higher, and
manager welfare is about 3.6 percent lower in the rotation condition than in the no ro-
tation condition. Thus, our results suggest rotation policies have reporting benefits for
firms not because they enable firms to extract the same information about operational
distortions at lower cost, but because they induce managers to “do what’s right” and
report more operational distortions.
We validate our theory in two ways. First, our theory predicts rotation policies increase
the operational distortions that managers report because the prospect of rotating to
a different business unit in the next period lowers both the exploitation and reward
value of operational distortions in the current period. Accordingly, the increase in
the reported operational distortions by managers should be driven by the prospect of
rotating to another business unit in the first period. Also, we should not find differences
in reported operational distortions between the rotation condition and the no rotation
condition in the second period because managers in both conditions are in economically
equivalent positions and the economic trade-off should thus be equally salient. Indeed,
we find the positive difference in operational distortions reported by managers occurs
in period one but not in period two.
Second, our theory also predicts rotation policies increase the likelihood that managers
view their reporting decision less as an economic decision and more as a decision en-
abling them to “do what’s right” for the firm. If our theoretical argument holds, then
the positive effect of rotation policies on the operational distortions that managers’
report should be stronger for managers who are more susceptible to choosing courses
of actions that benefit the owner in the laboratory experiment. In supplemental anal-
yses, we explore this assertion by analyzing managers’ empathy, which is an innate
personality trait reflecting managers’ capacity to understand and feel what other indi-
viduals are experiencing, thinking, and feeling (Davis, 1983; Jackson, 1994; Gunther,
Evans, Mefford, and Coe, 2007). When managers are better able to view and under-
stand the perspective of others, we expect those managers to respond more strongly to
the shift to a broader decision frame caused by rotation policies. Consistent with our
expectations, we find the positive effect of the rotation policy on reported operational
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distortions in the first period is stronger for more empathetic managers.
Our study contributes to accounting research and practice in multiple ways. We extend
research on managerial reporting, which is a core accounting concept known to remedy
information asymmetries inside firms, by examining the impact of rotation policies.
Our results suggest rotation policies could have important reporting benefits. Without
rotation policies, firms must either engage in an economic transaction with managers
to extract valuable information or carry the costs of leaving information in the lower
levels of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1995). Although some evidence suggests pref-
erences may cause managers to exhibit behavior similar to “doing what’s right” and
report information naturally (e.g., Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser, 2001), such
preferences alone are unlikely to lead to significant revelation of information in the
presence of strong economic incentives and trade-offs. In contrast to experimentally
testing general models of reporting behavior, our study illustrates how an intervention
such as rotation can cause individuals to shift from one perspective, i.e., viewing their
reporting decision as an economic decision, to another, i.e., viewing the reporting de-
cisions as a decision to do what is right for the firm without the aim to benefit from
it economically.
We also contribute to research examining interventions that help individuals frame
their decisions differently. Prior research demonstrates interventions, such as sanctions
and fostering a deliberate mindset, can affect how individuals frame decisions (e.g.,
Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999; Griffith, Hammersley, Kadous, and Young, 2014). Since
our proposed intervention, i.e., a rotation policy, lowers the saliency of economic trade-
offs and incentives for managers, it produces a shift towards a broader decision frame.
Building on research in decision-making, we sought to understand how such a shift in
the decision frame could enable managers courses of action that feel like they are the
right thing to do for the firm.
Our study also has important practical implications because it sheds light on a rela-
tively unexplored benefit of rotation policies inside firms. The impact of rotation poli-
cies on accounting decisions in firms has received relatively little attention in empirical
accounting research. We are only aware of Brüggen and Luft (2015) who examine the
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impact of rotation policies on initial project cost statements and subsequent continu-
ation proposals. Although empirical research on the consequences of rotation policies
for accounting is relatively scarce, surveys suggest that rotation policies are preva-
lent in practice.1 Our results provide support for the prevalence of rotation policies in
practices and suggest they can increase information quality inside firms. Our results
also offer useful insights for recruiters and promotion committee because the reporting
benefits produced by rotation policies can be leveraged by recruiting and selecting
managers who have stronger preferences for “doing what’s right.”
3.2. Hypotheses Development
3.2.1. Economic Trade-offs
When managers observe operational distortions to how their business unit’s perfor-
mance is measured, they become a valuable information source for improving the
quality of performance measurement in business units (Baiman and Evans, 1983; Dem-
ski and Sappington, 1989; Burney and Matherly, 2007; Indjejikian and Matjka, 2012).
However, managers may be reluctant to report about operational distortions when they
can benefit from them now and in the future. Under such circumstances, managers may
conceal the operational distortions in their business units and exploit them at the cost
of the firm. However, if firms put economic incentives in place, managers may give
up their informational advantage and report about the operational distortions in their
business unit.
Although firms could try to implement explicit incentives to elicit reports about oper-
ational distortions, the use of implicit incentives in such situations are more common
(Indjejikian and Matjka, 2012). For instance, firms may gift excess wages, expecting
that managers reciprocate with reports about operational distortions (Akerlof, 1982;
Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Hannan, 2005; Kuang and Moser, 2009, 2011),
1 One survey suggests that more than 55 percent of U.S. firms with more than 50 employees use
an explicit rotation policy (Osterman, 2000). In another survey, 43 percent of Midwestern U.S.
manufacturing firms report that they use rotation policies, and some specify that they use them
permanently (Jorgensen, Davis, Kotowski, Aedla, and Dunning, 2005).
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or they may motivate managers to report operational distortions by offering potential
discretionary rewards, such as salary increases, extraordinary benefits, career oppor-
tunities, and job security (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994; Brickley, Smith, and
Zimmerman, 2000; Gibbs, Merchant, Van Der Stede, and Vargus, 2004).
When firms use implicit incentives to motivate managers to report about the oper-
ational distortions that they uncover in their business units, we expect managers to
balance two competing economic pursuits. Specifically, managers compare the exploita-
tion value of concealing operational distortions in their business unit and the reward
value of reporting those operational distortions to the firm. When the reward value
of reporting operational distortions is higher than the exploitation value of concealing
operational distortions, managers may produce reports that resolve operational dis-
tortions in their business unit. To the extent that firms want to elicit reports about
operational distortions from managers, firms may introduce implicit incentives that
motivate managers to produce reports of sufficient quality. However, like explicit in-
centives, implicit incentives are costly for the firm, which calls for examining other
mechanisms that motivate managers to report about operational distortions.
3.2.2. Rotation Policies
We focus on the practice of rotating managers as a complementary mechanism to elicit
more operational distortions from managers than implicit incentives would realize on
its own. Firms often use rotation policies when agents possess private information
about or can control the way that their performance is measured or reported. For
instance, the board of directors has much information about and control over how
their performance is measured and reported and often rotate periodically (Gregory,
2001). Also, loan officers at financial institutions typically rotate because they possess
high-quality information about the repayment prospects of the clients they manage
(Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini, 2010). Prior analytical research highlights an im-
portant economic reason why rotation policies are prevalent in situations where agents
possess valuable information about performance measurement (Arya and Mittendorf,
2004, 2006; Prescott and Townsend, 2006). Specifically, rotation policies lower the
economic value of unit-specific information advantages for agents.
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— Figure 1 about here —
Building on prior empirical and analytical research on rotation policies, we expect
rotating managers across business units lowers the exploitation value of concealing
operational distortions. Figure 1 helps explain the consequences of rotation policies
for the exploitation value of concealing operational distortions in a two-period setting.
Managers who rotate spend one period in a business unit, which means the exploitation
value of concealing operational distortions in a business unit spans one period. In
contrast, managers who do not rotate spend two periods in the same business unit,
which means the exploitation value of concealing operational distortions in a business
unit spans two periods. Thus, rotation policies lower the exploitation value of concealing
operational distortions for managers.
A reduction of the exploitation value of concealing operational distortions for man-
agers should have an important economic benefit for firms; it enables firms to use
incentives to extract the same amount of information about operational distortions
from managers at a lower cost. Specifically, when non-rotating managers report about
operational distortions in their business unit in the first period, firms must at least
reward managers equal to the exploitation value of those operational distortions across
two periods. For rotating managers, however, firms must only compensate managers
equal to the exploitation value of those distortions across one period. Rotation poli-
cies, therefore, lower the cost of using incentives to elicit reports about operational
distortions from managers in the first period. In the second period, managers in under
a rotation policy and managers who are not under a rotation policy are in equivalent
conditions.
Since rotation policies help firms elicit the same information about operational dis-
tortions at lower cost, they do not tilt the economic trade-off that managers make
when they choose between concealing and reporting about operational distortions in
their business units. Specifically, rotation policies lower both the reward and exploita-
tion value of operational distortions for managers equally. Figure 1 again helps illus-
trate this economic prediction. When non-rotating managers make a reporting decision
about operational distortions in their business unit in the first period, they balance
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the exploitation value of concealing and the reward value of reporting operational dis-
tortions across two periods. In contrast, rotating managers balance the exploitation
value of concealing and the reward value of reporting operational distortions in one
period.
Since firms want to economize on their cost advantage of eliciting reports about opera-
tional distortions by keeping their incentives (i.e., the reward value) as close as possible
to the opportunity costs that managers incur when reporting about operational distor-
tions (i.e., their exploitation value), managers have nothing to gain in terms of welfare
from rotating periodically across business units. Therefore, if we rely on the economic
reasoning used in prior empirical and analytical research, we would expect not only
firms benefit from rotation policies by eliciting reports about operational distortions
from managers at lower cost, but also that rotation policies do not affect the amount
of information about operational distortions that managers report.
3.2.3. Doing What’s Right
Whereas prior studies primarily consider how managers trade-off conflicting economic
pursuits, our study complements such perspectives by considering a course of action
that is not the result of resolving the tension between two conflicting economic pur-
suits. Rather than resolving an economic trade-off, i.e., concealing versus reporting
operational distortions, managers may also consider reporting about operational dis-
tortions to do what is right for the firm without the aim to benefit from it economically
themselves. The last part of the previous sentence needs particular emphasis because
it implies managers who consider this course of action may actually report more in-
formation about operational distortions than they would have reported if they had
focused on resolving the economic trade-off they faced when uncovering operational
distortions. We argue managers are more likely to consider “doing what’s right” under
a rotation policy.
Since rotation policies lower both the exploitation and reward value of operational dis-
tortions in business units equally, economic reasoning suggests rotation policies do not
tilt the economic trade-off that managers face. However, rotation policies do decrease
the saliency of this economic trade-off because the negative impact of operational dis-
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tortions on firm welfare is unaffected by having a rotation policy in place. Specifically,
rotation policies decrease the manager’s economic interest in operational distortions
relative to the firm’s economic interest in operational distortions. By lowering the
saliency of this economic trade-off, rotation policies increase the likelihood managers’
change their perspective of the reporting decision when they make their reporting
decision before rotating to the other business unit.
When managers shift their perspective of the reporting decision away from resolving
two conflicting economic alternatives, it is easier for them to consider “doing what’s
right.” Research in psychology and decision-making suggests shifting to a broader deci-
sion frame increases awareness of other alternatives, objectives, and outcomes (Larrick,
2009). Having increased awareness that alternative options may exist makes it easier to
engage in divergent thinking and unlocks managers’ ability to consider other options
(McCrae, 1987; Runco, 1991; Silvia et al., 2008). When managers shift to a broader
decision frame, they are less fixated on choosing between exploiting operational distor-
tions versus reporting them to elicit rewards from the firm. Since the negative economic
consequences of operational distortions in business units for firm welfare are still in
place, a broader decision frame makes it easier to consider reporting about opera-
tional distortions to do what is right for the firm without the aim to benefit from it
economically themselves.2
Although we expect rotation policies make it easier for managers to “do what’s right,”
we do not expect such policies to activate managers’ preferences for such behavior
directly. Managers may prefer to do what is right for the firm because they experience
disutility if they do not reveal the truth about operational distortions (Evans et al.,
2001) or because they care about the welfare of the firm (Charness and Rabin, 2002).
Rather than affecting these preferences directly, as is has been argued in the case of
norms (e.g., Tayler and Bloomfield, 2011) and in response to decisions made by others
(e.g., Falk and Kosfeld, 2006), we expect rotation policies cause managers to use a
broader perspective that is more likely to capture the perspective and, therefore, eco-
2 Zhang, Gino, and Margolis (2018) study a similar shift from a narrow decision frame to a broader
decision frame in the context of moral decision-making. Although there is partial overlap between
our two studies, Zhang et al. (2018) do not consider rotation policies as an intervention nor a
reporting setting that revolves around operational distortions in business units.
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nomic interests of the firm. Thus, we expect that rotation policies increase the impact
of managers’ preferences for “doing what’s right” on their reporting decision.
In sum, our main hypothesis predicts expecting to move out of a business unit in-
creases the likelihood that managers view their reporting decision less as an economic
decision and more as a decision that enables them to “do what’s right” for the firm.
Therefore, we expect the prospect of rotation causes managers to report more opera-
tional distortions in their business units than implicit incentives would realize in the
absence of rotation policies. This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis: Managers who rotate to other business units report more operational




To test our hypothesis, we conducted a laboratory experiment using z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007).3 Throughout two periods, participants assumed either the role of
an owner, representing the firm, or the role of a manager, and they maintained their
role for both periods. We randomly matched each owner to two managers who were
responsible for one of two business units that together constitute one firm. We ma-
nipulated (between-subject) whether managers rotate to the other business unit in
period 2. In the no rotation condition, managers stayed with their business unit for
two periods under the same owner. In the rotation condition, managers switched to
each other’s business unit in the second period but remained under the same owner.
The period is a within-subjects factor (period 1 and period 2). The experiment com-
prised three stages: the instruction stage, the decision-making stage, and an ex post
questionnaire.




In the instructions stage, all participants read information about the contextual sce-
nario, roles, and period payoffs and the nature of information asymmetry between the
managers and owners.4 To enhance task understanding, the instruction stage also in-
cluded examples and quiz questions about the experimental setting. Participants had
to answer all quiz questions correctly to advance to the decision-making stage. We also
provided participants with feedback in case they gave a wrong answer.
After the instruction stage, the participants entered the decision-making stage where
they assumed their roles and interacted with each other for two periods. Figure 2 panel
A presents a timeline for each business unit. While each manager interacts with the
owner individually following the timeline, owners follow one timeline for each of the
two managers assigned to them. While managers can conceal operational distortions
in their business unit at the cost of their owner, they can also elicit a reward from
the owner because the owner can reciprocate managers’ reports about operational
distortions. Figure 2 panel B summarizes the owner’s and manager’s payoff functions
per business unit and period. Note that the owner’s total payoff in a period is two
times the payoff function listed in panel B (one for each manager).
— Figure 2 about here —
Before period 1, our experimental software allocates Distortioni0 to business unit i
using a random draw ranging from 0 to 25 points with increments of 5 points.5 At
the start of each period, the two managers privately observe the value of operational
distortions in their business unit (Distortionit−1).
6 Next, the managers choose the
value of their report (Reportit) between zero and the value of operational distortions
4 During the instruction stage, we informed participants about the fact that reports produced
by two different managers are not comparable because operational distortions are not directly
observable to the owner. To mitigate the possibility of comparisons even further, we imposed that
owners observed the value of managers’ reports and determined the size of managers’ rewards
sequentially rather than simultaneously within a period.
5 In the experiment, we use the more neutral label “Imperfection” to refer to Distortion to avoid
that participants develop negative affective responses to the terminology we use in the experi-
ment.
6 The owner and the managers know that only managers observe the value of operational dis-
tortions at their business unit. Owners and managers also know that the values of operational
distortions are independent across business units and fixed, unless a manager produces a valuable
report.
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in their business unit (Distortionit−1). The reports can be considered as resolving (part
of) the operational distortions in business units because values of managers’ reports
reduce the value of operational distortions in their business units after a period (i.e.,
Distortionit = Distortionit−1 − Reportit).7 The value of operational distortions after
period 1 (Distortioni2), therefore, positively impact the payoff function of the manager
in that business unit in period 2 and negatively impacts the owner’s payoff function
in period 2.
After both managers have chosen the value of their report, the owner observes those
report values and chooses the reward value to be allocated to each manager (Rewardit)
which lies between zero and the welfare benefits that accrue to the owner based on the
value of the manager’s report (i.e., b Reportit). Factor b is a publicly-known multiplier
reflecting the importance of operational distortions (and reports) for the owner’s payoff.
We assume operational distortions are a significant problem for the owner and that it
is meaningful for owners to solve those operational distortions. Therefore, we impose
that the benefits of managers’ reports for the owner in a period are higher than the
benefits of operational distortions for the manager in a period (i.e., b 1). We test the
robustness of our results by varying b randomly to take the value of either 2 (Low
Impact) or 3 (High Impact) for a firm. While we vary Distortioni0 and b, we restrict b
to have a maximum value of 3, so owners cannot earn a negative period payoff when
Distortionit equals 25 points.
8
At the end of both periods, the managers observe their report value, their reward, and
their payoff for the business unit they are in. The owner observes the report values
7 Since our focus is on managers’ decisions to report about distortions to performance measurement
in their business units, we assume distortions revealed to the firm are automatically resolved. In
other words, the values of managers’ reports in the first period (Reporti1) reduce the values of
their business unit’s operational distortion at the start of the second period (i.e., Distortioni1 =
Distortioni0 − Reporti1). Although there may be situations where firms cannot resolve opera-
tional distortions in the operational levels, awareness of such distortions will most likely elicit a
response on their part.
8 We ensured the expected period payoffs, which assume an expected operational distortion value
of 12.5 points, are equal for managers and owners if managers do not produce valuable reports
for owners and owners allocate no rewards. For managers, the expected period payoff equals 75
+ 12.5 = 87.5 points. For low impact (b = 2), the expected period payoff for owners is 75 2
12.5 = 50 points per manager. For high impact (b = 3), the expected period payoff for owners is
75 3 12.5 = 37.5 points per manager. Since we vary the impact (b) bordering equal probability
and owners were matched to two managers, the expected period payoff for the owners thus also
equals (50 + 37.5) / 2 2 = 87.5 points.
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produced by both managers and the reward values allocated to both business units.
Owners observe their payoffs for both business units only after the second period
because revealing those payoffs between period 1 and period 2 would enable owners to
trace the values of operational distortions back to both business units before period
2.
A key feature of our laboratory experiment is that about half of the firms, comprising of
one owner and two managers, have a rotation policy in place. In the rotation condition,
managers rotate to each other’s business unit in period 2 while managers stay in
the same business unit for two consecutive periods in the no rotation condition. In
both conditions, owners and managers have full access to their respective historical
information sets to prevent imperfect recall.
3.3.3. Participants
We conducted the laboratory experiment at a large Western-European university. We
recruited 306 business and economics students (i.e., 204 managers and 102 owners)
who responded to an email invitation. We conducted 18 experimental sessions, each
lasting around 45 minutes. Every experimental session contained between 12 and 21
participants. Participants ranged from 19 to 30 years old, and 60.52 percent are male.
On average, participants have an adequate command of English (averaging 3.92 on a
scale of 1 to 5) and an average work experience of between two and five years. All
participants had completed at least two math courses, two economics courses, one
accounting course, and one finance course at the university level.
As a reward for participation, we introduced a modest amount of course credit (2.5
percent of their total grade). In addition to this show-up incentive, participants also
earned money based on the choices that they made in the laboratory experiment.
Specifically, we paid 1.00 per 30 points earned in the laboratory experiment. Since
participants earned 190.50 points on average, their average payout is 6.39 for about 45
minutes of participation which is equivalent to an average rate of 8.52 per hour.
Participants’ scores on statements from the ex post questionnaire suggest they were
generally motivated to participate and that they found the instructions and proce-
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dures sufficiently clear. Specifically, using a seven-point Likert scale that ranges from
1 to 7, their mean score in the no rotation (rotation) condition for difficulty equals
2.386 (2.545) and their mean score in the no rotation (rotation) condition) for mo-
tivation equals 5.108 (5.176). A statement in the ex post questionnaire also presents
evidence of successful manipulation of the rotation policy. Participants in the rotation
condition agreed more, on a seven-point Likert scale that ranges from 1 to 7, with
the statement that managers moved to each other’s business unit in the second pe-




In Table 1, we present descriptive results on the business unit-level allowing us to an-
alyze the effect of rotation without regard to differences between periods. In this and
subsequent univariate tests, we use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test rather than the
standard t-test if we find violations of normality in the distribution of the data.10 We
calculate Report Percentagei, which we define as the total report value produced by
managers for business unit i (
∑2
t=1Reportit) divided by the maximum possible total
report value produced by managers for business unit i (Distortioni0). We also calculate
Reward Percentagei as the total rewards allocated to business unit i (
∑2
t=1Rewardit) di-
vided by the maximum possible total rewards allocated to business unit i (b·∑2t=1Reportit,
where b ∈ {2, 3}).
— Table 1 about here —
We first consider the rotation condition. Report Percentagei equals 70.5 percent on
average in the no rotation condition implying that, on average, 29.5 percent of the
original operational distortions in business units remain unresolved after the second
period. Thus, implicit incentives are reasonably successful in eliciting reports about
9 Excluding participants who failed this manipulation check from our analyses does not change
our inferences.
10 Our inferences do not change if we ignore normality assumptions and use only t-tests.
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operational distortions from managers in the no rotation condition. In addition, the
total rewards that owners allocate to business units is about 41.6 percent of the total
welfare benefit derived from managers’ total report value (Reward Percentagei: M =
0.416, S.D. = 0.247). Untabulated results suggest owners match their total rewards to
the total report value produced by managers in the no rotation condition because the
total reward to report value ratio equals 1.004 on average with a standard deviation
of 0.578. Thus, owners compensate managers for the opportunity costs they incur by
reporting operational distortions in their business unit, but, on average, they do not
reward more than these opportunity costs.
Now that we have established the baseline reporting decisions by managers and reward
allocations by owners, we test for differences between the rotation condition and the no
rotation condition next. We find Report Percentagei is higher in the rotation condition
than in the no rotation condition (Z = 3.413, two-tailed p-value = 0.001). Specifically,
the average total report value divided by the maximum possible total report value
is 12.5 percentage points higher in the rotation condition than in the no rotation
condition. Consistent with our theory, rotation appears to increase the operational
distortions that managers report. Inconsistent with economic reasoning, however, we
do not find owners reciprocate a smaller part of the total welfare benefit derived from
managers’ total report value back to managers under rotation compared to no rotation
(two-tailed p-value > 0.100). Jointly, however, these effects do lead to an increase in
the average total payoff of owners under rotation by 8.4 percent (Z = 2.436, two-
tailed p-value = 0.015) and a decrease in the average total payoff of managers under
rotation by 3.6 percent (Z = -2.857, two-tailed p-value = 0.004). Yet these payoff
consequences of rotation do not appear to be the cause of owners extracting the same
information about operational distortions at lower cost, but, instead, they appear
to be driven by owners extracting more information about operational distortions
at the same costs. Descriptive results, therefore, provide preliminary support for our
hypothesis and underlying theory.
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3.4.2. Rotation
Our theory predicts rotation policies increase the operational distortions that man-
agers report because the prospect of rotating to a different business unit in the next
period lowers both the exploitation and reward value of operational distortions in the
current period. When the saliency of these two competing economic pursuits is lower,
it is easier for managers to take the firm’s perspective and consider “doing what’s
right.” Accordingly, the rotation effect should be driven by the prospect of rotating
to another business unit in period 1, and we should not find differences between the
rotation condition and the no rotation condition in period 2 because managers in both
conditions are in economically equivalent positions and the economic trade-off should
thus be equally salient. We evaluate the validity of our theory by splitting the variables
displayed in Table 1 by period and reporting them in Table 2.
— Table 2 about here —
Consistent with our theory, we observe differences in Report Percentageit between the
rotation condition and the no rotation condition in period 1 (t167 = 3.615, two-tailed
p-value < 0.001), but not in period 2 (two-tailed p-value > 0.100). Since the economic
trade-off becomes less salient for managers in period 1, managers shift to a broader
decision frame that includes the firm’s perspective. This perspective taking makes it
easier to “do what’s right.” Although we find no differences between conditions in the
Reward Percentageit in period 2 (two-tailed p-value > 0.100), we do find evidence of a
difference in Reward Percentageit in period 1 (Z = -2.878, two-tailed p-value = 0.005).
Consistent with economic reasoning, owners reciprocate managers less for the reports
about operational distortions they produce in period 1 because the exploitation value
of operational distortions for managers is lower in period 1 under rotation.
3.4.3. Supplemental Analyses
Modelling the Full Process
To explore the effects of rotation policies more thoroughly, we estimate a general-
ized structural equations model that simultaneously considers the complete decision-
making process in the laboratory experiment. Specifically, we estimate absolute report-
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ing and reward values for each manager in each period while controlling for relevant
available information sets and relationships between these variables. Each manager
has four endogenous variables, i.e., Report1, Reward1, Report2, and Reward2, which
are the absolute report and reward values in each period, and three exogenous vari-
ables, i.e., Rotation, High Impact, and Distortion1. Table 3 presents the generalized
structural equations model using four columns that relate each endogenous variable
to each other and to the exogenous variables based on the setup of the experimen-
tal setting. Columns 1 and 2 present the results for period 1 and columns 3 and 4
present the results for period 2. We also estimate robust standard errors clustered by
manager.
— Table 3 about here —
The results that pertain to period 1 (column 1 and 2 in Table 3) provide support for
our hypothesis. Column 1 reveals support for a positive direct effect of Rotation on
Report1 (b = 2.080, two-tailed p-value < 0.001). Although managers report an average
of 0.507 value points of Distortion1 to owners in the no rotation condition, they report
an average of 2.080 value points more in the rotation condition. Column 2 shows owners
reciprocate, on average, 0.904 value points of Report1 back to managers. Although we
find evidence of a direct negative effect of Rotation on Reward1, when we account for
positive indirect effects through Report1 (b = 1.881, two-tailed p-value < 0.001), we
find no evidence for a total effect of Rotation on Reward1 (two-tailed p-value > 0.100).
In sum, we find more evidence for the prediction that the prospect of rotation induces
managers to report more operational distortions. Although rotation policies enable
owners to reciprocate fewer rewards for the operational distortions that managers
report, the total effect of rotation policies on owners’ rewards is indistinguishable from
zero because they must also pay managers more because they report more operational
distortions.
The results that pertain to period 2 (column 2 and 4 in Table 3) provide more support
for our theory. Since managers are in identical positions in both conditions in period 2,
we find no evidence that rotation has a direct effect on manager and owner behavior in
period 2 (two-tailed p-value > 0.100). In the absence of rotation, we find Distortion1
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and Report1, which jointly comprise Distortion2 in the no rotation condition, impact
Report2 as expected. In period 2 of the no rotation condition, managers thus report
0.321 value points of Distortion1 to owners unless they have already reported this
information to owners in period one (b = -0.270, two-tailed p-value = 0.022). In the
rotation condition, the equation specifying Report2 works differently. Specifically, in the
rotation condition, Distortion2 is not a linear combination of Distortion1 and Report1
anymore. Thus, we have included appropriate interaction terms and conditional effects
to account for the structural differences between these two conditions.
When Rotation equals 1, we find what the manager experienced in the other unit in
period 1 does not impact his or her reporting behavior anymore in period 2 (two-
tailed p-value > 0.100). However, we do find the remaining leftover distortion that
rotating managers uncover positively impacts their reports in period 2, i.e., Rotation
Distortion2 (b = 0.430, two-tailed p-value = 0.078). Furthermore, we find no evidence
that this behavior differs from managers’ period 2 reports in the no rotation condition,
i.e., a linear comparison between with the coefficients of Rotation Distortion2 and
Distortion1 is not significant (two-tailed p-value > 0.100).
However, since we have established that rotation policies impacts managers’ period 1
reporting behavior positively, it may have an indirect negative effect on the managers’
reporting opportunities in period 2 through the reduction of operational distortions
in that particular business unit. Specifically, since Rotation directly increases Report1
with 2.080 points and the impact of Distortion2, which comprises both Distortion1 and
Report1, on Report2 in the rotation condition equals 0.430 points, there is an indirect
negative effect of Rotation on Report2 (b = -0.894, two-tailed p-value = 0.002).
11
In sum, while we find rotation policies positively impact the operational distortions
managers report to owners in period 1, their period 1 rewards remain the same in
absolute terms. Also, consistent with our theory, we find no direct effects of rotation
policies on manager and owner behavior in period 2. However, we do find evidence
of indirect effects of rotation on period 2 behavior through its direct effects in period
1.
11 Although we do not model this effect and treat it as exogenous for per manager observation in
the rotation condition, it should be a valid estimate of how large this indirect effect is.
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Empathy
Next to the timing of the rotation effect, our theory also predicts rotation policies
increase the likelihood that managers view their reporting decision less as an economic
decision and more as a decision that enables them to “do what’s right” for the firm.
Specifically, rotation policies lower the saliency of the economic trade-off that man-
agers face which increase the likelihood that they use a broader decision frame that
also incorporates the perspective of the firm and, therefore, the firm’s economic inter-
ests. Although our results display outcomes that are consistent with our theory and
inconsistent with economic reasoning alone, we should be able to find more evidence
that our theory is the driving force behind the increase in reported operational dis-
tortions by managers under rotation. To this purpose, we employ a “block” approach
where we try to “block” the positive effect of rotation using arguments that build on
our original theory (MacKinnon, Kisbu-Sakarya, and Gottschall, 2013).
Our theory predicts rotation policies do not impact managers’ preferences to “do
what’s right” directly, but instead make it easier for managers to consider “doing what’s
right.” Thus, we expect that the impact of rotation policies is attenuated for managers
who are less susceptible to taking and understanding the perspective of the firm. For
instance, managers who have less empathy possess a lower capacity to understand and
feel what others are experiencing, thinking, and feeling (Davis, 1983; Jackson, 1994;
Gunther et al., 2007). In our laboratory experiment, the firm is represented by another
participant, i.e., the owner, because in real life settings managers, who are in charge
of business units, also report to superiors who represent the firm, making empathy a
personality trait that is relevant for the rotation effect.
We expect that managers who score lower on empathy are less sensitive to the shift to
a broader decision frame that also incorporates the firm’s perspective. To test whether
being less empathetic attenuates the causal effect of rotation policies, we use the aver-
age of three items from the Jackson Personality Inventory to measure Empathy in the
ex post questionnaire.12 To keep the analysis simple, we run a regression predicting
12 Empathy is the average of three self-rated items on a 7-point Likert-scale (α = 0.711) of an
empathy subscale in the Jackson Personality Inventory (Jackson, 1994).
- I suffer from others’ sorrows. (+)
- I am deeply moved by others’ misfortunes. (+)
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Report Percentagei1 from Table 2 as a function of Rotation and Empathy. We also
estimate robust standard errors clustered by manager, and we exclude observations
where Distortioni0 is zero because those participants faced no decision concerning the
dependent variables of interest.
— Table 4 about here —
Column 1 of Table 4 reveals both Rotation and Empathy are positively related to the
operational distortions that managers report in period 1 (b = 0.154, two-tailed p-value
< 0.001 for Rotation; b = 0.039, two-tailed p-value = 0.043 for Empathy). Consistent
with our assertion, column 2 reveals support for an interaction effect between Rotation
and Empathy (b = 0.088, two-tailed p-value = 0.016). 13 Thus, Rotation has a weaker
positive effect on the operational distortions that managers report to owners when
managers are less capable in understanding and feeling what owners are experiencing,
thinking, and feeling. This result provides indirect support for our prediction that
rotation policies facilitate managers in using the reporting decision to “do what’s
right.”
Considering the Other Manager
In this supplemental analysis, we examine a potential alternative explanation for the
positive effect of managerial rotation on managers’ reports about operational distor-
tions. Specifically, we test whether managerial rotation increases the value of managers’
reports in period 1 because it may induce feelings of being exposed as a dishonest or
opportunistic manager by the other manager in period 2. In Hertzberg et al. (2010), for
instance, rotation policies trigger loan officers to report more bad news about defaults
because they fear that the incoming loan officer will reveal the bad news up in the
hierarchy. Rotating managers may, therefore, increase their reports about operational
distortions in period 1 because leaving operational distortions unresolved would allow
the other manager to reveal in period 2 to the owner that they did not report about
- I am not interested in other people’s problems. (−)
13 Following Baron and Kenny (1986), we confirm that there are no indications that our moderator,
i.e., Empathy, is correlated to our independent variable of interest, i.e., Rotation (ρ = -0.08, two-
tailed p-value = 0.256). This is also consistent with our theoretical prediction that rotation
policies do not impact managers’ preferences to “do the right thing.”
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operational distortions when they could have.14
We use Consider Other Manager, which we measure using the average of three self-
rated items on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (com-
pletely agree), to capture the degree to which each manager considers the other man-
ager’s actions when they choose the value of their report in period 1.15 Descriptive,
non-tabulated results show managers in the rotation condition are more likely to con-
sider the effect of the other manager’s decisions than are managers in the no rotation
condition in period 1 (t202 = 4.142, two-tailed p-value < 0.001).
16
— Table 5 about here —
To examine whether Consider Other Manager explains the rotation effect, we run a
mediation analysis for an indirect effect of Consider Other Manager by estimating a
simplified structural equations model in Table 5. Note that this structural equations
model is far less elaborate as the generalized structural equations model in Table 4
because it only focuses on the manager’s decision to report operational distortions in
period 1. Because of this simplification, we scale Reporti1 with Distortioni0. Specifically,
we estimate the effect of Rotation, which equals 1 (0) for the rotation (no rotation)
treatment, on Report Percentagei1 (typically known as the c-path) and the effect of
Consider Other Manager on Report Percentagei1 (the b-path). We simultaneously
estimate the impact of Rotation on Consider Other Manager (the a-path). In all three
equations, we control for the information available to managers in period 1 and for the
parameters we vary in our experimental setting.
The bootstrapping results with 500 replications estimating a bias-corrected 95 percent
14 There is some tension with respect to this alternative explanation because it requires that a
manager expects in period 1 that the owner will reward the other manager in period 2 for
revealing the dishonesty of the manager in period 1. Importantly, prior accounting research
shows reporting misconduct and dishonesty requires that such behavior is rewarded by owners
and that managers perceive owners as fair (Zhang, 2008).
15 Consider Other Manager (α = 0.678)
- When making a period 1 Improvement decision, I consider whether the other Manager makes
a period 1 Improvement larger than 0. (+)
- When making a period 1 Improvement decision, I consider the other Manager finding out that
I have not made a period 1 Improvement when I could. (+)
- When making a period 1 Improvement decision, I expect that the other Manager makes a
period 1 Improvement larger than 0. (−)
16 M = 3.873 and S.D. = 1.299 in the rotation condition and M = 3.111 and S.D. = 1.326 in the
no rotation condition.
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confidence interval for an indirect effect of Rotation on Report Percentagei1 through
Consider Other Manager show the bias-corrected 95 percent confidence interval con-
tains zero (0.015, 0.044). Thus, we find no evidence that managers’ considerations of
other managers drive the rotation effect. However, Table 5 does present support for our
theoretical prediction that rotation positively affects the report value that managers
produce in period 1 because the bootstrap results present evidence for a positive direct
effect of Rotation on Report Percentagei1 (b = 0.138, two-tailed p-value < 0.001).
3.5. Discussion
Our results reveal important consequences of rotation policies undocumented by prior
analytical and empirical research. Economic reasoning suggests rotation policies en-
able firms to elicit the same information about operational distortions at lower costs.
However, we find the total costs of information extraction for firms remain the same
regardless of whether a rotation policy is in place or not. Yet firms do experience wel-
fare benefits under a rotation policy not because information extraction costs are lower
but because rotation policies make it easier for managers to consider “doing what’s
right” and report more operational distortions at their own expense.
Our study may also have consequences for our knowledge of how peer reporting systems
help solve adverse selection problems in multi-agent settings. Since rotation policies
subject managers to shared rather than individual information advantages over time
(Arya and Mittendorf, 2004), they could enable an incoming manager to reveal to the
firm that a previous manager concealed information from the firm in the past. Some
empirical research in banking emphasizes the peer reporting purpose of rotation poli-
cies in banks to elicit information from loan officers (Hertzberg et al., 2010). However,
prior experimental work finds mixed results on the effectiveness of peer reporting sys-
tems in eliciting more information from managers (Towry, 2003; Zhang, 2008). When
we temporally rotate managers across business units, we also find no evidence that the
threat of having one’s dishonesty revealed by another manager increases the informa-
tion that managers’ report. Instead, our results suggest rotation policies increase the
information that managers report because they increase the likelihood that managers
79
view their reporting decision less as an economic decision and more as a decision that
enables them to “do what’s right” for the firm.
Our findings also allow us to derive testable empirical predictions for the quality of in-
formation inside firms (Chen, Martin, Roychowdhury, Wang, and Billett, 2017; Cheng,
Cho, and Yang, 2018). Gallemore and Labro (2015) define internal information quality
in terms of the accessibility, usefulness, reliability, accuracy, quantity, and signal-to-
noise ratio of the data and knowledge collected, generated, and consumed within an
organization. First, we expect rotation policies may improve the production and dis-
tribution of knowledge and information that resides in the lower levels of the firm.
Rotating managers across business units may, therefore, improve the internal informa-
tion quality of firms. We speculate the positive impact on internal information quality
is particularly strong for larger, multidivisional firms looking to improve how they track
the progress and success of their strategy and business models (Ittner and Larcker,
2003; Huelsbeck, Merchant, and Sandino, 2011).
Our study also underscores the importance of empathy as an important management
skill when firms use rotation policies (Kellett, Humphrey, and Sleeth, 2002, 2006; Gun-
ther et al., 2007). According to the results of our supplemental analyses, the reporting
benefits of managerial rotation are stronger for managers who excel at understand-
ing and feeling what other individuals are experiencing, thinking, and feeling (Davis,
1983; Jackson, 1994; Gunther et al., 2007). The main benefit of empathy as a manage-
rial trait is that managers who possess this trait respond more strongly to situations
that induce them to take the perspective of others. Careful selection of the right type
of manager may, therefore, complement the reporting benefits of rotation policies in
firms.
How robust our results will be to changes in the setting is uncertain. While we find
rotation policies have benefits for managers’ reports about operational distortions in
their business units, their benefits for other types of reports are unclear. Rotation
policies may also have costs that our laboratory experiment does not capture. For
instance, managers may find it difficult to work in business units with which they
lack experience, decreasing their ability to produce reports (Arya and Mittendorf,
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2004). Firms may also prefer to keep managers with particular business units for a
multitude of other reasons (Meyer, 1994; Ortega, 2001). We expect firms to balance the
benefits of rotation policies against their costs. When the costs of a rotation policy are
higher, firms may want to reduce its rotation frequency, potentially to the point where
managers stay in one business unit for the length of their employment term.
One limitation that presents opportunities for future research is that our study is lim-
ited to local information advantages that provide persistent exploitation opportunities
for managers unless they are resolved. It may be meaningful to study more complicated
forms of information asymmetry in firms. For instance, when business units are in some
respects similar, multiple managers may share information advantages which may in-
duce stronger collusion among managers if they are aware of this collective information
advantage (Zhang, 2008; Evans, Moser, Newman, and Stikeleather, 2016).
Another limitation worth mentioning is that managers were unable to create oper-
ational distortions in their business units and, therefore, increase the value of their
information advantage by, for instance, tasking subordinates to undertake actions that
advantage measured performance more than true performance in their business unit
(Bloomfield, 2017). Managers were only able to produce reports that directly trans-
lated into welfare benefits for their firm. Managers were unable to convincingly “fake”
their reports or produce reports that contain cheap talk.’ Firms may also be unable
to process and deal with the operational distortions reported by managers because it
may be too difficult or costly to do so.
Lastly, our study focuses on how rotation policies impact managers’ reports about
operational distortions in the presence of an implicit incentive system. Thus, we do
not focus on examining the role of rotation policies in the absence of such incentive
systems. According to our theory, the presence of an implicit incentive system causes
managers to focus on balancing two competing economic pursuits. When rotation
policies are introduced, it helps managers focus less on resolving these competing
economic pursuits and change to a broader decision frame. A broader decision frame
subsequently increases the likelihood that they report about operational distortions.
Although the presence of an implicit incentive system is warranted by the motivation
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of our study and theory, it would be interesting to consider how rotation policies affect
managers’ reports in the absence of implicit incentive systems.
While future research can explore these and other limitations, we believe we have
documented a common phenomenon in practice. However, exploring the empirical
adequacy of our theory is an important task for future empirical research.
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Figures
Fig. 3.1. Visual Representation of Rotation in a Two-period Setting
Fig. 3.2. Timeline of the Laboratory Experiment and Payoffs
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Table 1: Descriptive Results (Unit-level) 
Condition 
Report  






0.367 (0.228)  
[N =84] 
247.353 (32.894)  
[N =51] 
167.119 (8.801)  
[N =51] 
No Rotation 
0.705 (0.256)  
[N =85] 
0.416 (0.247)  
[N =85] 
228.235 (42.409)  
[N =51] 
173.435 (13.725)  
[N =51] 
     
Difference 0.125 –0.049 19.118 –6.316 
Statistic 
p-value 
Z = 3.413 
p = 0.001 
𝑡  = –1.330 
p = 0.185 
Z = 2.436 
p = 0.015 
Z = –2.857 
p = 0.004 
Table 1 displays results across periods. For Report Percentagei and Reward Percentagei, we exclude observations 
from our sample where Distortioni0 is equal zero because no reports nor rewards could be given for that business 
unit; p-levels are two-tailed, the numbers within the round parentheses are the standard deviations, the number 
within rectangular parentheses are the number of observations. 
 
Report Percentagei is the total report value produced by managers for business unit i (∑ Reportit
2
t=1 ) divided by 
the maximum possible total report value produced by managers for business unit i (Imperfectioni0). 
Reward Percentagei is the total reward value allocated by the owner for business unit i (∑ Rewardit2t=1 ) divided 
by maximum possible total reward value by the owner for business unit i (b∙∑ Reportit
2
t=1 , where b ∈ {2, 3}). 
Total Payoff Owner is the total payoff of the owner in the experiment. 





Table 2: Descriptive Results (Period-level) 
 Report Percentageit Reward Percentageit Payoff Ownerit Payoff Managerit 




0.574 (0.398)  
[N = 51] 
0.385 (0.248) 
[N = 79] 
0.316 (0.268)  
[N = 50] 
56.471 (15.802) 
[N = 102] 
67.206 (10.494) 
[N = 102] 
86.098 (8.765) 
[N = 102] 
79.245 (5.188)  
[N = 102] 
No Rotation 
0.462 (0.249) 
[N = 85] 
0.474 (0.362)  
[N = 78] 
0.502 (0.263) 
[N = 78] 
0.298 (0.254)  
[N = 60] 
51.147 (18.652) 
[N = 102] 
62.971 (13.372)  
[N = 102] 
88.451 (10.400) 
[N = 102] 
81.078 (6.266)  
[N = 102] 
         
Difference 0.148 0.100 –0.117 0.018 5.324 4.235 –2.353 –1.833 
Statistic 
p-value 
𝑡  = 3.615 
p < 0.001 
Z = 1.423 
p = 0.155 
𝑡  =  –2.878 
p = 0.005 
𝑡  =  0.357 
p = 0.722 
Z = 1.930 
p = 0.054 
Z = 2.456 
p = 0.014 
Z = –1.499 
p = 0.134 
Z = –2.208 
p = 0.027 
Table 2 presents within-period results. For Report Percentageit (Reward Percentageit), we exclude observations from our sample where Distortionit-1 (Reportt) is 
equal to zero, because no reports (rewards) could be given for that business unit; p-levels are two-tailed, the numbers within the round parentheses are the standard 
deviations, the number within rectangular parentheses are the number of observations. 
 
Report Percentageit is the report value produced by the manager for business unit i in period t (Reportit) divided by the maximum possible report value the manager 
could produce for business unit i in period t (Distortionit-1). 
Reward Percentageit is the reward value by the owner for business unit i in period t (Rewardit) divided by the maximum possible reward value by the owner for 
business unit i in period t (b · Reportit, where b  equals 2 or 3). 
Payoff Ownerit is the payoff of the owner in period t for business unit i. See Figure 2 for the calculation. Note that owners earn points for two business units. 





Table 3: Generalized Structural Equations Model 







































































N = 204, p-levels are two-tailed; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; the numbers within the parentheses are 
the robust standard errors clustered by manager; AIC = 4294.645, BIC = 4384.234. 
 
Reportt is the report value chosen by the manager in period t. 
Rewardt is the reward value by the owner for the manager in period t. 
Rotation equals 1 (0) if managers were in the rotation (no rotation) treatment. 
High Impact equals 1 if the impact of distortions and reports for the owner was high (b = 3), else 0 (b = 2). 
Distortionit is the operational distortion value in period t. 
 
* The equation in column 3 includes one conditional exogenous variable, i.e., Rotation × Distortion2, and two 
other interaction variables to model the different paths across the rotation and no rotation condition. Specifi-
cally, when Rotation equals 0, then Distortion2 is a linear combination of Distortion1 and Report1 which we 
include as separate terms. However, when Rotation equals 1, then Distortion2 is not a linear combination of 
Distortion1 and Report1. When Rotation equals 1, we must therefore include the conditional term Rotation × 
Distortion2 (to account for the distortion in the new unit which the manager enters under rotation) and two 
interaction terms with Distortion1 and Report1, respectively, to account for the fact that the effects of those 







Table 4: Regressions (Period 1) 


































N 169 169 
F-statistic 5.305*** 5.470*** 
R-squared 0.120 0.151 
p-levels are two-tailed; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; the numbers within the parentheses are the robust 
standard errors clustered at the business unit level; we exclude observations where Distortionit is zero because 
those participants faced no discretion with respect to the dependent variables of interest. 
 
Report Percentageit is the report value by the manager for business unit i in period t (Reportit) divided by the 
maximum possible report value the manager could produce for business unit i in period t (Distortionit-1). 
Rotation equals 1 (0) if managers were in the rotation (no rotation) treatment. 
Empathy is the average of three self-rated items on a 7-point Likert-scale (α = 0.711) of an empathy subscale 
in the Jackson Personality Inventory (Jackson 1994). 
- I suffer from others’ sorrows. (+)  
- I am deeply moved by others' misfortunes. (+) 
- I am not interested in other people's problems. (-) 
High Impact equals 1 if the impact of distortions and reports for the owner was high (b = 3), else 0 (b = 2). 
Distortionit is the operational distortion value for business unit i in period t. 
Reportit is the report value by the manager for business unit i in period t. 







Table 5: Structural Equations Model (Period 1) 
Independent Variables 
(1) 


























R-squared 0.119 0.097 
N = 169; p-levels are two-tailed; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; global goodness of fit is RSMA = 0.000, 
CFI = 1.000, SRMR = 0.000; the numbers within the parentheses are the bootstrap standard errors using 500 
replications and clustered by business unit i; We excluded observations where Distortioni1 is zero because 
those participants faced no discretion with respect to the dependent variables of interest. 
 
Variable Definitions 
Report Percentagei1 is the report value by the manager for business unit i in period 1 (Reporti1) divided by the 
maximum possible report value the BU manager could recommend for business unit i in period 1 (Distortioni1). 
Rotation equals 1 (0) if managers were in the rotation (no rotation) treatment. 
High Impact equals 1 if the impact of distortions and reports for the owner was high (b = 3), else 0 (b = 2). 
Distortionit-1 is the operational distortion value for business unit i before period t. 
Consider Other Manager is the average of three self-rated items on a 7-point Likert-scale (α = 0.678) 
- When making a period 1 Improvement decision, I consider whether the other Manager makes a period 1 
Improvement larger than 0. 
- When making a period 1 Improvement decision, I consider the other Manager finding out that I have not 
made a period 1 Improvement when I could. 
- When making a period 1 Improvement decision, I expect that the other Manager makes a period 1 Im-
provement larger than 0. 
 
95% bias-corrected confidence intervals (bootstrap using 500 replications) 
Indirect effect of Rotation on Report Percentagei1 through Consider Other Manager (-0.015, 0.044) 
Total effect of Rotation on Report Percentagei1: (0.048, 0.208) 
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Managerial responsibility for reporting is an important way to address coordination
problems in firms because it enables managers to produce and distribute vital informa-
tion for various business decisions, such as investment decisions, production decisions,
capital budgeting decisions, and marketing decisions. Thus, granting managers re-
sponsibility for reporting can increase firm profits and welfare. However, technological
advancements in areas of information technology and data science increasingly enable
firms to produce and distribute such information at lower costs. As these technological
advancements become more accessible and cheaper to implement, practitioners have
been challenging long-standing ideas about the purpose of managers and their role
in informing decision-making in firms (McAfee, Brynjolfsson, Davenport, Patil, and
Barton, 2012; Webb, 2015; Moules, 2018).
In this study, we seek to clarify whether granting managers responsibility over re-
porting has a purpose beyond eliciting information from managers. To this purpose,
we conduct an experimental exhibit. Laboratory experiments in accounting often fo-
cus on testing relatively established, clear theoretical predictions (Bloomfield, Nelson,
and Soltes, 2016). In contrast, experimental exhibits examine relatively unexplored
settings to develop new theory and raise new research questions for future research
(Sugden, 2005). Experimental exhibits are well-suited to discover previously unknown
regularities, are often used in areas where it is challenging to develop precise theo-
retical predictions and are well-suited to study complex settings. Our experimental
exhibit has two main objectives: (1) to explore whether managerial responsibility for
reporting has other purposes besides eliciting information from managers and (2) to
illuminate the fundamental processes surrounding managers’ reporting decisions in
more detail.
An experimental exhibit is appropriate to pursue our research objectives because it is
difficult to predict the extent to which granting managers responsibility over reporting
has other purposes besides eliciting information from managers. Traditionally, eliciting
local information from agents have been the main purposes of disclosure, reporting, and
communication (Jensen and Meckling, 1995; Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein,
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1995; Hofmann and Indjejikian, 2018). Namely, it is the informational access that
matters to parties that consume managers’ reports and it should be irrelevant to them
whether managers have made a choice to unveil their information to them or not (i.e.,
the information effect).
However, when managers report their information to other parties in firms, they also
make a conscious choice to give up an information advantage that they otherwise could
have exploited. Behavioral scholars demonstrate that the presumed intentions behind
individuals’ choices can also produce more cooperative responses (Rabin, 1993; Kagel,
Kim, and Moser, 1996; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2003).
Since managers make a conscious decision among a set of reporting alternatives, their
decision to report their information to other parties may, therefore, also communicate
an intention to exhibit more cooperative behavior now and in the future (i.e., the
intention effect). In contrast, a decision to withhold information from other parties may
communicate an intention to exhibit more competitive behavior and zero-sum thinking.
Since reporting information to other parties may have an intention effect next to an
information effect, it is challenging to formulate a precise theoretical prediction about
the purpose of granting reporting responsibility to managers, making it particularly
meaningful to conduct an experimental exhibit.
Another reason why an experimental exhibit helps pursue our research objectives is
that it allows us to examine the purpose(s) of granting managers responsibility for
reporting in a more complex but realistic intrafirm setting. In practice, firms are often
multi-tiered, implying that parties must not only coordinate their activities with mul-
tiple other parties but also cross the multiple hierarchical layers that define their firm.
Granting managers responsibility for reporting may be of particular value in hierarchi-
cal settings because of its potential to solve coordination problems that are character-
istic of such complex environments. However, a hierarchical setting also makes it more
challenging to formulate specific predictions about how managers choose to report
their information and about the potentially different effects caused by their reports.
Thus, an experimental exhibit enables us to generate potentially interesting insights
about managerial reporting in hierarchical settings and explore how parties operating
in these systems overcome commitment problems (Baiman, 1990, 2014).
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Our experimental exhibit uses a series of laboratory hierarchies in which three par-
ties, an owner, employee, and manager, repeatedly cooperate over a fixed number of
periods to generate and distribute wealth. Owners possess a fixed amount of capital
and periodically choose how much to invest it in the firm. In every period, employees
receive control over the investment made by the owner and can choose how much of
it to use for production and how much of it to keep for themselves. Managers fulfill
a post-production role and are responsible for distributing the wealth that employee
production generates among all three parties (Miller, 2003; Hales and Williamson,
2010). Specifically, in every period, managers receive full control over wealth which is
a function of employee production and an exogenous random multiplier that reflects
the economic power of the firm in that period.
The conventional economic prediction for our hierarchical setting is that cooperation
completely breaks down across all periods. However, previous laboratory experiments
show that some cooperative play to realize more socially efficient outcomes early on
during the experimental exhibit can be rationalizable (e.g., Schwartz and Young, 2002).
We are primarily interested in how managers’ reporting choices produce more socially
efficient outcomes for the laboratory hierarchies. In our primary experimental treat-
ment (i.e., the Reporting Treatment), we grant managers responsibility for reporting.
That is, they possess private information about economic power and the wealth gen-
erated by the firm which enables them to extract wealth from the firm undetected.
However, in the Reporting Treatment, managers also choose, at the start of each pe-
riod, whether to credibly report their privately held information to the owner and/or
the employee in an attempt to elicit more cooperative play and ultimately realize more
socially efficient outcomes.
Although the Reporting Treatment grants us the opportunity to illuminate the funda-
mental processes surrounding managers’ reporting choices in a high amount of detail,
we also have two reference treatments, i.e., the Full Information Treatment and the
Private Information Treatment, in which managers carry no responsibility for report-
ing. In the Full Information Treatment, the owner and employee already have access
to the manager’s information about economic power and the wealth generated by the
firm. In the Private Information Treatment, the owner and the employee never have
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access to the manager’s information about economic power and the wealth generated
by the firm. Together with the data generated by the Reporting Treatment, we can
use the data generated in reference treatments to determine the extent to which the
relationships between managers’ reporting choices and social efficiency are driven by
the information effect and the intention effect.
When we combine the data from all three experimental treatments, we find reporting
to both owners and employees positively relates to total welfare in firms through the
information effect, and that the intentions communicated by managers’ voluntary re-
porting choices have no incremental explanatory power. Thus, to improve total welfare
in firms, it may be irrelevant whether managers carry responsibility over reporting or
not. Instead, it is sufficient that all parties have access to the manager’s information.
However, our results also show reporting to both owners and employees is negatively
related to welfare dispersion in firms, and that this relationship is driven by the in-
tentions that managers’ reporting choices convey. Thus, to lower welfare dispersion in
firms, it may be important that managers carry responsibility for reporting so they
can make a choice to unveil their information.
We offer three main contributions to the accounting literature. First, we provide empir-
ical evidence revealing whether managerial responsibility for reporting has a purpose
in hierarchical settings beyond eliciting information from managers. Although similar
managerial reporting processes have been studied in experimental accounting, most of
this work does not operationalize user-participants receiving the reports that manager-
participants produce (e.g., Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser, 2001; Schwartz and
Young, 2002; Evans, Moser, Newman, and Stikeleather, 2016). The absence of users of
managers’ reports makes it challenging to account for potential intention effects pro-
duced by managers’ reporting choices on the behavior exhibited by other parties and
on the behavior exhibited by managers themselves. To the best of our knowledge, the
few accounting scholars that do operationalize the parties receiving managers’ reports
do not disentangle potential intention effects from information effects using similar
manipulations (e.g., Rankin, Schwartz, and Young, 2008; Zhang, 2008).
Second, since we find reporting to all other parties operating in the firm is positively
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related to more equal welfare distribution in firms, we also contribute to the emerging
practical and academic interest in pay dispersion in firms. Pay dispersion has been
increasing over time (Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2008) and can have detrimental effects
on job satisfaction in firms (Card, Mas, Moretti, and Saez, 2012). Accounting scholars
have also increased their attention to studying the consequences of pay dispersion
in firms (e.g., Brown, Evans, Moser, and Presslee, 2016; Guo, Libby, and Liu, 2016;
Guo, Huo, and Libby, 2019). By conveying intentions to exhibit cooperative behavior,
our results suggest managerial reporting may be a useful process to realize welfare
outcomes in firms that are fairer, resulting in a lower welfare gap between the most
fortunate and the least fortunate in firms.
Lastly, our study also contributes to literature on how different types of managers make
decisions, and how this affects those influenced by those decisions. Several archival
studies document how heterogeneity in style of managers impacts their decision-making
(e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce, 2013; Jia, Van Lent, and
Zeng, 2014). Evidence from laboratory experiments have also revealed that experi-
enced managers make different decisions in the context of controls (Feichter, 2016;
Cardinaels, Dierynck, Yin, and Beckers, 2018). Our results give guidance on which
personality traits may be of particular value for firms when they consider granting
them reporting responsibility. When managers possess reporting responsibility in our
laboratory experiment, we find that natural variation their reporting choices emerges
endogenously. We find no evidence that this cross-sectional and temporal variation
in managers’ reporting choices relates to structural features of our experimental de-
sign. Instead, we find that managers with more grit, which captures a long-term focus
and perseverance (Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, and Kelly, 2007; Duckworth and
Quinn, 2009), are more likely to develop a reporting strategy that increasingly dis-
tributes the managers’ private information to all other parties operating in the firm.
Our results also suggest that managers with a stronger prosocial attitude are generally
more likely to report their private information to all other parties. Thus, our study
suggests that grit and a prosocial attitute may be relevant in promotion and hiring
decisions, especially when appointing managers who carry responsibility for report-
ing.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the details of the
experimental exhibit. Section 3 reports the results of the experimental exhibit. Section
4 discusses the results, their implications, and their limitations.
4.2. Experimental Exhibit
4.2.1. Experimental Setting
The attributes of our experimental setting relate to several areas of prior experimental
and theoretical research. Among these are information asymmetry, the use of reporting
in the formation of reputations in multiperiod settings, the difficulties of cooperating
across multiple periods, and the challenge of cooperating with more than one other
individual. In our experimental setting, three parties interact periodically to produce
and distribute wealth. The role of the owner, who is located at the top of the firm, is
to decide whether the firm is worthy of investment. The employee, who is located at
the bottom of the firm, is responsible for using the owner’s investment for production.
Managers, who are located in the middle of the firm, are responsible for managing
the wealth that employee production generates and distributing it back to owners and
employees. We thus focus on a post-production role for managers (Miller, 2003; Hales
and Williamson, 2010).
— Figure 1 about here —
Figure 1 displays the sequence of events that parties go through in every period. First,
the owner chooses how much capital, valued at 10 points, to invest. Next, the employee
chooses how much of the investment to use for production by choosing a whole number
between 0 points and the amount invested by the owner. Our software realizes wealth as
a function of production times economic power (i.e., Wealth = Production · Economic
Power). Economic Power is a random multiplier with a minimum value of 3 and a
maximum value of 6 and it can only take whole numbers.1 After wealth is realized,
1 While firms received a new economic power realization each period, we strengthen internal va-
lidity by randomly determining one fixed set of eight economic power realizations ranging from 3
to 6 in advance of the data collection. The predetermined set of Economic Power realizations in
periodic order: (6, 4, 5, 5, 3, 6, 4, 5). Therefore, average realized Economic Power equals 4.75. We
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the manager distributes it between all parties (i.e., Wealth =
∑I
i Sharei). The three
parties repeat this sequence for eight periods, which is common knowledge.
Payoff Owner = 10 − Investment + ShareOwner
Payoff Employee = Investment − Production + ShareEmployee
Payoff Manager = ShareManager
The formula’s above display the payoff function for each party in a period. Under
conventional economic assumptions, all parties are fully rational and only interested in
maximizing their payoffs, enabling us to derive the following equilibrium strategies for
the stage game: managers retain all wealth, employees keep all investments, and owners
refrain from investing their capital. In the last period, managers have no reputation
concerns and, regardless of history, they retain all wealth disfavoring the interest of
owners and employees. Employees anticipate the manager’s best response and choose
to retain all investment and produce nothing causing wealth to be zero. In turn, this
prospect leads owners to invest nothing and retain all their capital. By backward
induction, this outcome is also the prediction for all previous periods. Since the stage
game equilibrium strategies are unique, they also comprise the equilibrium strategies
for the finite repeated game leading to 80 points for owners (8 periods times 10 points)
and zero points for employees and managers.
In contrast to this inefficient outcome, there is also a socially efficient outcome. To
realize the socially efficient outcome, managers must distribute wealth by equating all
three payoff functions. Employees, in turn, need to use all available investment for
production, and owners should invest all their capital in the firm. The socially efficient
outcome produces the following payoff for each party: (60 + 40 + 50 + 50 +30 + 60 +
40 + 50) / 3 = 1262
3
. Theoretically, there are no equilibria in which parties realize the
socially efficient outcome by exhibiting cooperative play. However, prior experimental
research shows, in games of sufficient length, parties may act as if the game were
repeated infinitely until the last few periods (e.g., Schwartz and Young, 2002). Thus,
we take the perspective that cooperative play may be part of a rational attempt to
increase one’s individual payoff.
allocate this set, in advance, making sure that all parameters and variables, other than parties’
decisions, are the same for all participants.
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We measure the degree to which parties realize the socially efficient outcome in two
ways. First, we measure Total Welfare, i.e., the sum of all three payoffs in a period,
and Welfare Dispersion, i.e., the difference between the highest and lowest payoff in a
period. Although prior research often focuses exclusively on Total Welfare as a mea-
sure of social efficiency in similar settings (e.g., Schwartz and Young, 2002), we also
include Welfare Dispersion as a measure of social efficiency. First, we include Welfare
Dispersion as another measure for social efficiency because recent accounting research
has spent an increasing amount of attention to welfare differences in firms (e.g., Brown
et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2016, 2019). Second, both variables are imperfectly related to
each other, implying we cannot use one measure hoping that it automatically captures
the other. Specifically, the socially efficient outcome is characterized by maximum To-
tal Welfare (380 points) and no Welfare Dispersion (0 points). The inefficient outcome
is characterized by minimum Total Welfare (10 points) and non-zero Welfare Disper-
sion (10 points). However, there are other outcomes where accounting for Welfare
Dispersion is meaningful. For instance, if owners invest all points, employees use ev-
erything for production, Economic Power equals 6, and managers keep all Wealth for
themselves, then Welfare Dispersion is maximized at 60 points while Total Welfare
equals 60 points. However, if the manager would allocate half of those points back to
the owner, then Welfare Dispersion would be reduced to 30 points while Total Wel-
fare would remain the same. Since the last outcome is closer to the socially efficient
outcome than the former, it is important to make a distinction between Total Welfare
and Welfare Dispersion.
4.2.2. Experimental Treatments
We now proceed to describe each of our three experimental treatments. Since our first
objective is to examine whether managerial responsibility for reporting in firms has
a purpose beyond eliciting information from managers, we create three experimental
treatments: the Reporting Treatment, the Private Information Treatment, and the Full
Information Treatment. In our primary experimental treatment, i.e., the Reporting
Treatment, managers choose, at the start of each period, whether Economic Power is
credibly reported only to themselves, to them and one of the two other parties, or to
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all other parties at the end of the period. Operationalizing managerial reporting in this
way also implies managers choose, at the start of the period, who observes Wealth,
ShareManager, and Payoff Manager at the end of the period. Although managers always
observe all information at the end of a period, owners and employees are only guaran-
teed to observe the owner’s investment, employee production, their and each other’s
share of wealth allocated by the manager, and their and each other’s payoffs unless the
manager reports his or her private information to them. Thus, our operationalization
of managerial reporting focuses on the transfer of credible information to other parties
and is similar to how other scholars have operationalized it (e.g., Waymire, Lunawat,
and Xin, 2015). Appendix A displays a sequence of screenshots of the first period in
the Reporting Treatment.
The other two experimental treatments are reference treatments that we use to dis-
entangle the intention and the information effect of managers’ reporting decisions.
In the first reference experimental treatment, i.e., the Full Information Treatment,
the setting is the same as in the Reporting Treatment, but all parties now have ac-
cess to all information and managers have no reporting choice at the start of each
period. In the second reference experimental treatment, i.e., the Private Information
Treatment, managers still possess private information about Economic Power, Wealth,
ShareManager, and Payoff Manager, but they cannot report this private information to
other parties in their firm.
Before the experiment starts, we inform all participants Economic Power is a whole
number with a minimum value of 3 points and a maximum value of 6 points with
equal probability. During the experiment, we also provided participants with all their
available historical information sets, such that participants had full access to past and
current information whenever decisions had to be made. The historical information
overview also included range estimates if historical information, such as Economic
Power, Wealth, ShareManager, and Payoff Manager in the Reporting Treatment, was
missing. We made this crucial design choice because it reduces imperfect recall of
past behavior and cognitive constraints on participant behavior, which can influence
the development of repeated cooperative play (Basu, Dickhaut, Hecht, Towry, and
Waymire, 2009).
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4.2.3. Participants and Data Collection
We recruited 375 business and economics students who responded to an email invita-
tion. Participants’ age ranges from 18 to 43 years old, and 58 percent of the partici-
pants are male. A large majority of the participants have part-time or full-time work
experience (90 percent), and all participants completed at least one math course, an
economics course, an accounting course, and a finance course at a university level. As
a show-up incentive, we introduced a modest amount of course credit (2.5 percent of
their total grade), or money (2.50) depending on whether a participant has enrolled in
one of our two management accounting courses.2 In addition to this show-up incentive,
participants also earned money based on their choices, other participants’ choices, and
situational factors. Specifically, we paid an extra 1.00 per 19 points earned. Payout
realizations, in addition to the show-up incentive, range from 0.15 to 8.63.
We designed the experiment using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At the start of the
laboratory experiment, participants entered an instruction phase in which they read
information about their roles, payoffs, and specific information related to the mechanics
of the experimental setting. This phase included instructions and a few basic control
questions. When participants gave wrong answers to the control questions, our software
provided feedback to participants. We carefully designed a concise set of instructions
and control questions that only checked whether participants understood the basics of
the study. After the instruction phase, participants entered the decision-making phase
in which they assumed their roles and interacted with each other for eight periods.
After all eight periods were over, they completed an ex-post questionnaire containing
several items intended to provide insight into participants’ thoughts and feelings during
the study. The 375 participants generated a total of 1, 000 firm-period observations for
our complete sample.
2 When we control for the show-up fee in our analyses, our results are qualitatively similar.
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4.3. Results
4.3.1. Managerial Reporting and Social Efficiency
We begin our analysis by examining the degree to which managers’ reporting choices
impact social efficiency in the Reporting Treatment. As noted earlier, we measure social
efficiency in two ways; (1) Total Welfare as the sum of all parties’ payoffs in a period,
i.e., Total Welfare = Payoff Owner + Payoff Employee + Payoff Manager, and (2)
Welfare Dispersion as the maximum payoff minus the minimum payoff in a period,
i.e., Welfare Dispersion = max {Payoff Owner,Payoff Employee,Payoff Manager} −
min {Payoff Owner,Payoff Employee,Payoff Manager}.
FINDING 1: Reporting to all other parties is positively related to Total Welfare and
negatively related to Welfare Dispersion.
EVIDENCE:
To study the relationship between managers’ reporting choices and social efficiency, we
estimate population-averaged panel regressions according to the methods specified by
Papke and Wooldridge (2008). Population-averaged panel regressions are well-suited
for our data because they are characterized by non-independent observations due to
the repeated observations at the level of the individual participants (Hubbard, Ahern,
Fleischer, Van der Laan, Satariano, Jewell, Bruckner, and Satariano, 2010). Specif-
ically, we use the xtgee command in Stata 15 with an exchangeable within-group
correlation structure, and robust standard errors which give valid standard errors no
matter the within-group correlation structure and are as if we cluster standard errors
by firm. Our aim is to predict the population-averaged effects on Total Welfare and
Welfare Dispersion of a dummy variable for reporting to all other parties (i.e., Full Re-
porting. We also run two more population-averaged panel regressions that also include
controls for partial reporting choices, i.e., Owner Reporting, and Employee Reporting.
In all equations, we also include fixed effects for periods to control for time trends
and effects. We also control for Welfare Dispersion in the regression predicting Total
Welfare, and we control for Total Welfare in the empirical specification for Welfare
Dispersion because we expect these two to be imperfectly related given the design of
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the experimental exhibit.
— Table 1 about here —
Table 1 reports the results of four population-averaged panel-data regressions. Col-
umn 1 (2) reveals Total Welfare (Welfare Dispersion) is higher (lower) when man-
agers report to all other parties rather than no one or to one other party (b = 1.839,
two-tailed p-value = 0.083 for Total Welfare; b = -2.705, two-tailed p-value < 0.001
for Welfare Dispersion). Including Owner Reporting and Employee Reporting in the
empirical specifications (column 3) also reveals Total Welfare (Welfare Dispersion) is
higher (lower) when managers report to all other parties rather than no other party (b
= 2.296, two-tailed p-value = 0.040 for Total Welfare; b = -3.722, two-tailed p-value
< 0.001 for Welfare Dispersion). Lastly, column 4 also reveals Welfare Dispersion is
lower when managers report to the employee rather than to no other party (b = -2.335,
two-tailed p-value = 0.004).
4.3.2. The Information versus Intention Effect
While we find managers’ reporting choices can improve social efficiency, we assess
the relative importance of the information versus the intention effect of managerial
reporting next. Specifically, reporting to all other parties grants those parties access to
information that managers otherwise could withhold and exploit (i.e., the information
effect). However, reporting this information to all other parties also involves a choice
by the manager which could communicates an intention about exhibiting cooperative
behavior now and in the future (i.e., the intention effect).
To examine the relative importance of the information and intention effect, we use
our complete sample of 125 managers and 1, 000 manager-period observations which
also includes the data of the two reference treatments, i.e., the Full Information Treat-
ment and the Private Information Treatment. Including the two reference treatments
enables us to create two new independent variables that replace Full Reporting. The
first variable is Information Access, which equals one when all parties have access
to all information else zero, and Manager Choice, which equals one when managers
made a choice about reporting their private information to other parties else zero.
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When we interact these two variables, we cover all possible combinations of the infor-
mation transferred and intentions communicated by the manager’s decision to report
information to all other parties.
FINDING 2: Reporting to all other parties is positively related to Total Welfare through
the information effect and negatively related to Welfare Dispersion through the inten-
tion effect.
EVIDENCE:
We re-estimate the population-averaged panel-data regressions in Table 1, but we re-
place Full Reporting with our two new independent variables. Our main dependent
variables are Total Welfare, which equals the sum of Payoff Owner, Payoff Employee,
and Payoff Manager, and Welfare Dispersion, which equals the maximum payoff minus
the minimum payoff. In all equations, we also include fixed effects for periods to control
for time trends and effects. We estimate both population-averaged panel-data regres-
sions using an exchangeable within-group correlation structure and robust standard
errors that are as if they are clustered on the firm.
— Table 2 about here —
Table 2 columns 1 and 2 report the results for the population-averaged panel-data re-
gressions that exclude partial reporting dummies. Column 1 reveals Information Access
has a positive relationship with Total Welfare (b = 3.561, two-tailed p-value = 0.096).
Thus, collective availability of information without the manager reporting it increases
efficiency and produces more welfare in firms. Since we find no support that Manager
Choice nor its interaction with Information Access impact Total Welfare (two-tailed
p-value > 0.100), we conclude the relationship between Full Reporting and Total Wel-
fare reported in Table 1 is driven by the information effect and that the intentions
behind managers’ reporting choices have no incremental explanatory power. Column
2 reveals Manager Choice has a direct positive relationship with Welfare Dispersion
(b = 1.800, two-tailed p-value = 0.024), and we also find Managerial Choice interacts
with Information Access to attenuate and further lower the former positive relationship
(b = -3.899, two-tailed p-value < 0.001). Since we find no support that Information
Access is directly related to Welfare Dispersion (two-tailed p-value > 0.100), we can
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conclude that the effect of Full Reporting on welfare dispersion reported in Table 1 is
driven by the intention effect. Specifically, choosing to withhold information from all
other parties increases Welfare Dispersion while choosing to share it decreases Welfare
Dispersion after controlling for informational differences. In columns 3 and 4, we re-
estimate the empirical specifications but control variables for partial reporting choices.
Our inferences are qualitatively similar.3
4.3.3. Modelling the Intrafirm Process
Having found managers’ reporting choices may have both an intention and informa-
tion effect, we attempt to model the complete intrafirm process next. This enables
us to explore not only how parties make decisions, but also how managers’ reporting
choices relate to these decisions. We estimate a comprehensive path model for the
data generated in the Reporting Treatment. Our path model represents the process as
depicted in Figure 1, but with the addition of the reporting choice managers make
before owners choose how much capital to invest in the firm. In total, we estimate
five equations simultaneously. Four of these equations are decisions made by parties in
the firm. Managers choose to whom to report Economic Power, Wealth, ShareManager,
and Payoff Manager. Owners choose Investment, Employees choose Production, and
Managers choose ShareEmployee and ShareOwner simultaneously. Since managers are the
only party who makes a simultaneous decision at the end of a period, we correlate
the error terms of the equations for ShareEmployee and ShareOwner. In each equation,
we include the relevant independent variables for each step of the process. We also
include reporting choice dummies in each equation except in the equation of Wealth
because Wealth is automatically calculated after an employee chooses Production. In
all equations, we include period fixed effects to control for time trends and effects. We
also use robust standard errors that are clustered by firm.
FINDING 3A: Reporting to all other parties rather than no other party has a direct
positive relationship with owners’ investments.
3 In Table 2, we focus on the complete dataset which includes all three experimental treatments
and we use controls for partial reporting choices in the last two columns. However, when we
exclude panel observations where managers chose to report to either the employee or the owner,
our inferences are also qualitatively similar.
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FINDING 3B: Reporting to all other parties rather than no other party has an indirect
positive relationship with employees’ production.
EVIDENCE:
The path model displayed in Table 3 displays good overall fit: RMSEA = 0.031, CFI
= 0.999, and SRMR = 0.002. When we inspect the first two columns, we find reporting
to all other parties rather than no other party, has a direct effect on Investment (b =
1.273, two-tailed p-value = 0.004). We find no such direct relationship between Full
Reporting and Production (two-tailed p-value > 0.100). However, we do find evidence
for an indirect relationship between reporting to all other parties rather than no other
party and Production (b = 0.929, two-tailed p-value = 0.004). Although reporting to
all other parties rather than no other party influences owners’ decisions directly, it has
an indirect effect on employees’ decisions.
FINDING 3C: Reporting to all other parties rather than no other party has a direct pos-
itive relationship with the share of wealth allocated to owners and to employees.
FINDING 3D: Reporting to all other party rather than no other party has an indi-
rect positive relationship with the share of wealth allocated to owners and to employ-
ees.
FINDING 3E: Reporting exclusively to one party rather than no other party has a
direct positive relationship with the share of wealth allocated to that party.
FINDING 3F: When owners invest more, they (employees) receive a higher (lower)
share of wealth.
FINDING 3G: When employees produce more, they (owners) receive a higher (lower)
share of wealth.
EVIDENCE:
Table 3 reveals reporting to all other parties rather than no other party relates posi-
tively to the share of wealth allocated to owners and employees (b = 1.161 , two-tailed
p-value = 0.004 for ShareEmployee; b = 1.317, two-tailed p-value = 0.011 for ShareOwner).
However, when we estimate total indirect effects, we find reporting to all other parties
rather than no other party relates positively to the shares of wealth allocated to owners
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and employees through its relationship with Investment, Production, and Wealth (b
= 1.636, two-tailed p-value = 0.008 for ShareEmployee; b = 1.931, two-tailed p-value =
0.003 for ShareOwner).
— Table 3 about here —
We also find evidence in the last two columns that partial reporting choices impact
how managers allocate Wealth. Specifically, reporting exclusively to one party has a
direct positive relationship with the Wealth allocated to that party (b = 1.636, two-
tailed p-value = 0.008 for ShareEmployee; b = 1.931, two-tailed p-value = 0.003 for
ShareOwner). We also find the decisions of owners and employees directly relate to
the share of wealth that they receive from managers. When owners invest more, they
(employees) receive a higher (lower) share of wealth (b = -0.373, two-tailed p-value
< 0.001 for ShareEmployee; b = 0.264, two-tailed p-value < 0.001 for ShareOwner). Also,
when employees produce more, they (owners) receive a higher (lower) share of wealth
(b = 0.312, two-tailed p-value = 0.081 for ShareEmployee; b = -0.307, two-tailed p-value
= 0.032 for ShareOwner).
4.3.4. Managers’ Reporting Choices
In this section, we explore managers’ reporting choices in more detail, and we examine
the extent to which personality variables relate to managers’ reporting choices. Like
the previous section and the first section, we restrict ourselves exclusively to 62 man-
agers who produced 496 manager-period observations in the Reporting Treatment. We
measure managers’ reporting choices by making a distinction between reporting to all
other parties, one other party, and no other party.
FINDING 4A: Managers reporting choices vary in earlier periods, but they increasingly
report to all other parties over time.
EVIDENCE:
— Figure 2 about here —
In Figure 2, we plot the frequencies of managers’ reporting choices across all eight
periods. Figure 2 reveals a trend in managers’ reporting choices. In earlier periods,
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managers vary considerably in their reporting choices. Specifically, in period 1 through
4 (n = 248), managers report to all other parties 41 percent of the time, to one other
party 39 percent of the time, and to no other party 20 percent of the time. However, in
later periods, managers are more likely to report their private information to all other
parties. Specifically, in period 5 through 8 (n = 248), managers report to all other
parties 55 percent of the time, to one other party 24 percent of the time, and to no
other party 21 percent of the time. A statistical test that compares the frequency of
reporting to all other parties between the first four periods and the last four periods
confirms the increase is statistically significant (Z = 3.052, two-tailed p-value = 0.002).
Also, it appears the difference primarily originates from a change from partial reporting
to full reporting.
FINDING 4B: Managers who report to all other parties rather than one or no other
party create a better reputation for themselves over time.
EVIDENCE:
— Figure 3 about here —
A key question is whether managers follow up on the intentions signaled by their
reporting choices. Thus, we examine how managers’ reporting choices relate to their
wealth allocation decision during the experimental exhibit. Specifically, we split man-
agers in the Reporting Treatment into two groups (Reporting Managers and Non-
reporting Managers) based on a median split of how often they reported to all other
parties rather than one or no other party during the experimental exhibit. We measure
whether the manager allocated more wealth back to both owners and employees than
the input that each separately put into the firm. The cumulative version of this vari-
able we treat as the managers’ reputation. If managers follow up on their decision to
report to all other parties, then we should observe that those managers build a better
reputation for themselves over time.
Figure 3 presents the manager’s reputation over time split by the type of manager
(Reporting Managers and Non-reporting Managers). The figure reveals reporting man-
agers build a better reputation over time than non-reporting managers. Overall, re-
porting managers also tend to build a better reputation than non-reporting managers
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(Z = 6.044, two-tailed p-value < 0.001).
FINDING 4C: Grit is positively related to reporting to all other parties.
FINDING 4D: A prosocial attitude is positively related to reporting to all other par-
ties.
EVIDENCE:
The ex-post questionnaire includes various instruments that measure participants’
personality. To examine the relationship between the resulting personality variables
and managers’ reporting choices, we estimate a multinomial logit panel regression
that predicts the likelihood of Reporting, i.e., managers reporting to all, the owner,
or the employee rather than no other party in a period. The independent variables
of interest are Grit which captures a long-term focus and perseverance (Duckworth
et al., 2007). We measure Grit as the average of eight short grit scale items rated on
a seven-point Likert scale (Duckworth and Quinn, 2009).4 We also include dummies
from the Social Value Orientation scale by Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, and Van Vugt
(Van Lange et al.) and the average values of items in the Big-Five Short scale (Gosling,
Rentfrow, and Swann, 2003). In the multinomial logit panel regression, we also include
fixed-effects for periods to control for time trends and effects. We use robust standard
errors that are clustered by firm.
— Table 4 about here —
Table 4 reveals Grit is positively related to the likelihood of reporting to all other
parties (b = 0.662, two-tailed p-value = 0.011). We estimate the marginal effect of
Grit keeping all other predictors at their means (Greene, 2012). The average marginal
effect of a one-unit increase in self-reported grit, which ranges from 3.375 through 7.000
with an average of 4.833, increases the likelihood of reporting to all other parties by
11.6 percent (two-tailed p-value = 0.050). Table 4 also reveals a positive relationship
between Agreeableness, which is defined as a managers’ tendency to be compassionate
and cooperative rather than suspicious and antagonistic towards others, and the likeli-
4 Cronbach’s alpha of Grit in our primary experimental condition equals 0.668. We also calculate
Grit as the average of six short grit scale items excluding items 2 and 6 because their item-rest
correlation is low (< 0.300) and their alpha if excluded is higher. While internal consistency of
this alternative measure improves (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.700), our inferences remain qualitatively
similar.
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hood of reporting to the employee (b = 0.556, two-tailed p-value = 0.006). The average
marginal effect of a one-unit increase in self-reported agreeableness, which ranges from
1.500 through 7.000 with an average of 4.339, increases the likelihood of reporting to
the employee by 3.62 percent (two-tailed p-value = 0.086).
Table 4 also reveals some interesting results for the Social Value Orientation scale
by Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, and Van Vugt (Van Lange et al.). Specifically, we
find that a prosocial attitude is positively related to the likelihood of reporting to all
other parties (b = 1.674, two-tailed p-value = 0.001). Compared to managers with an
individualistic and competitive attitude, the likelihood of reporting to all other parties
rather than to one and no other party is 37.7 percent higher for managers with a
prosocial attitude. Interestingly, however, we also find that an individualistic attitude
is positively related to the likelihood of reporting to all other parties (b = 1.196,
two-tailed p-value = 0.032). Compared to managers with a prosocial and competitive
attitude, the likelihood of reporting to all other parties rather than to one and no other
party is 23.8 percent higher for managers with an individualistic attitude.
Figure 2 displays evidence of a trend in managers’ reporting decisions; managers tend
to increasingly report their private information to all other parties over time. Since
Grit captures a managers’ long-term focus and perseverance (Duckworth et al., 2007;
Duckworth and Quinn, 2009), we further examine how it may relate to managers’
inclination to change to reporting to all other parties faster during the experimental
exhibit. To this purpose, we add Period, which equals the number of the period, and its
interaction with Grit to the multinomial logit panel regressions that predict Reporting
reported in Table 4. Non-tabulated results reveal Grit indeed interacts with Period to
relate to the likelihood of reporting to all other parties (b = 0.161, two-tailed p-value
= 0.051). Post-estimation tests reveal no evidence of a linear trend for managers who
score on the 25th percentile of Grit (two-tailed p-value > 0.100). However, we do find
evidence of a positive linear trend for managers who score on the 75th percentile of
Grit (b = 0.155, two-tailed p-value = 0.052).
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4.4. Discussion
Our experimental exhibit explores the extent to which managerial reporting has a
purpose beyond the production and distribution of information in firms. Although
managers’ voluntary reporting choices vary, we find they can realize more socially
efficient outcomes. Specifically, we find reporting to all other parties rather than one
or no other party positively relates to total welfare and negatively to welfare dispersion.
We assess whether these relationships are driven by the information and the intention
effect. Our data show the informational access granted by managers’ reporting choices
alone (i.e., the information effect) drive the positive relationship between reporting to
all other parties and total welfare. In contrast, it is the intentions to exhibit cooperative
behavior communicated by managers’ reporting choices (i.e., the intention effect) that
matter for the negative relationship between reporting to all other parties and welfare
dispersion in firms.
Our study also has implications for the purpose of internal information quality in firms
(e.g., Hodge, Kennedy, and Maines, 2004; Gallemore and Labro, 2015). We sought to
explore purposes of managerial reporting in hierarchical settings beyond its goal to
produce and distribute information. Our results do confirm granting reporting respon-
sibility to managers can improve the quality of internal information, thereby, increasing
the welfare that firms realize. While this may suggest technological systems can re-
place an important purpose of managerial reporting in firms, we also find managers’
reporting choices communicate intentions to other affiliates which may lower welfare
dispersion in firms. These intentions cannot be replaced by more advanced technolog-
ical systems, suggesting firms may want to consider employing managers as informa-
tion intermediaries if they want to obtain equal welfare distribution throughout the
firm.
Taken together, our results suggest research considering the role of managerial report-
ing in firms needs to distinguish between the different roles for managerial reporting.
A promising avenue for future research is to test whether firms uniquely focusing on
welfare maximization have more advanced information systems in place accompanied
by a lower degree of involvement of managers compared to firms who also aim to lower
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welfare dispersion. Based on our results, we also expect a negative relationship between
managerial involvement in reporting and welfare dispersion in firms.
Our findings also illuminate how managers’ voluntary reporting choices, directly and
indirectly, relate to decision-making in hierarchical settings. We find evidence of both
direct and indirect relationships with other decision-making processes in firms, and we
find substantial variation in managers’ voluntary reporting choices in the Reporting
Treatment. Although managers increasingly report to all other parties over time, most
variation in reporting choices is located in the first four periods of the experimental
exhibit. We have also identified two key personality variables that positively relate to
the likelihood that managers report to all other parties. A more prosocial attitude,
for instance, positively relates to the likelihood that managers use their reporting
responsibility to distribute information to all affiliated parties rather than just some
or no other parties. Prosocials care more strongly about noble and social causes than
individualists and competitors (Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, and Van Vugt, Van Lange
et al.). Since prosocial managers are more likely to use their reporting responsibility to
report to all rather than some or no other parties, they may be a meaningful addition
to firms.
Another important personality trait identified by our analyses is grit because it relates
to how managers’ voluntary reporting choices evolve over time. We find managers
with more grit evolve their reporting choices more strongly toward reporting to all
rather than some or no other parties in their firm. Managers who possess more grit are
more focused on long-term goals and possess more perseverance to realize those long-
term goals despite having setbacks (Duckworth et al., 2007; Duckworth and Quinn,
2009; Duckworth, 2016). Since efficiency in our hierarchical setting depends on strong
repeated cooperative play, grit may also be an important personality trait for managers
with reporting responsibility in firms where success depends strongly on how well
different parties collaborate with each other over long periods of time.
However, recent work in psychology and on personality has criticized the construct va-
lidity and relative importance of grit compared to other higher-order personality traits.
Specifically, these critiques focus primarily on whether grit is a two-dimensional theo-
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retical construct, comprised of both a consistency of interest and perseverance dimen-
sion, and whether it sufficiently predicts individual success and achievement beyond
other closely-related theoretical constructs, such as conscientiousness and self-control
(Duckworth and Gross, 2014; Rimfeld, Kovas, Dale, and Plomin, 2016; Credé, Tynan,
and Harms, 2017). While we deem it meaningful to conceptualize and test the distinc-
tiveness and empirical adequacy of different psychological and personality constructs
in the behavioral sciences, this debate does not dispute our finding that higher levels
of grit on the part of managers, or a closely-related (set of) psychological construct(s),
has important consequences for their reporting decisions in firms. Importantly, we find
grit has incremental explanatory in explaining managerial reporting behavior while
controlling for other personality variables. Thus, both conceptually and empirically,
grit is useful in explaining the data generated by our experimental exhibit.
Like all research, we recognize that ours is subject to limitations. One limitation which
yields opportunities for future research is that only one party possesses private infor-
mation in our experimental setting. On the flip side, as more parties possess private
information that is valuable to other parties in the firm, there is also more potential for
managerial reporting to improve social efficiency. While private information possessed
by different parties may be omnipresent in firms, there are other (more complicated)
forms of information asymmetry that may obstruct parties in realizing more socially
efficient outcomes. For instance, developing and testing a similar setting characterized
by shared private information (e.g., Evans et al., 2016) may be a promising avenue for
future research.
Another limitation is that our experimental exhibit focuses on cooperative play sus-
tained by time which fits more closely to multilateral arrangements that are less for-
malized, such as implicit and trust contracts. A large theoretical literature, however,
extends the principal agency framework to model firms as a nexus of formal arrange-
ments such as incentive contracts (e.g., Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein, 1992;
Melumad et al., 1995; Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein, 1997; Mookherjee and
Reichelstein, 1997; Amir, 2000; Feltham, Hofmann, and Indjejikian, 2016; Hofmann
and Indjejikian, 2018). Since firms are often a combination of both formal and infor-
mal arrangements, it may be insightful to study firms in this way. While this may
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lead to special cases of our experimental setting, a few experiments already have docu-
mented different combinations of contracts governing multilateral systems (e.g., Hales
and Williamson, 2010).
Lastly, we ignore the production and absorption costs of managers’ reports. Prior re-
search suggests both the production and absorption of reports can be a costly exercise
causing some reports to be non-verifiable (Dewatripont and Tirole, 2005; Liberti and
Petersen, 2019). In our experimental setting, however, managers can produce reports
without cost (other than losing their information advantage) that report, at the end
of the sequence, verifiable information about Economic Power, Wealth, and how much
Wealth they retain to other parties in their firm. We ignored such direct costs in our
experimental exhibit because we wanted to compare managerial reporting to refer-
ence treatments where the information reported to parties was either available or not.
Since the costs of information availability are also zero in those experimental treat-




Fig. 4.1. Overview of the Experimental Setting
Fig. 4.2. Managers’ Reporting Choices
Figure 2 displays reporting choice frequencies of managers. All other parties means the
manager chose to report private information to the owner and the employee, One other party
means the manager chose to report private information to the owner or the employee, and
No other party means the manager chose not to report private information.
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Fig. 4.3. Managers’ Reputation and Reporting Choices
Figure 3 displays the manager’s reputation over time split by manager type (reporting or
non-reporting). The Manager’s Reputation is a cumulative score of whether the manager
allocated more wealth back to the owner than the owner invested in the firm and allocated
more wealth back to the employee than the value of production. Reporting (Non-reporting)
Managers are managers who reported (did not report) to all other parties more than the
median number of times during the experimental exhibit (which equals 3).
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Appendix A: Experimental Materials
In this appendix, we provide an example of four screens presented to owners, employees, and managers in the first period. Note that we refer to
“Output” instead of “Wealth” in the experimental materials. Since this is the first, the historical information table is missing.
The Manager’s Reporting Decision
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For the sake of this example, we have entered the value 10 for the investment. Note, however, that our software left this value blank when owners
had to make their investment decision.
The Owner’s Investment Decision
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For the sake of this example, we have entered the value 10 for the production. Note, however, that our software left this value blank when
employees had to make their production decision.
The Employee’s Production Decision
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For the sake of this example, we have entered the values for the manager’s allocation decision (i.e., 11, 15, and 16), and we have pressed the
Allocate Shares’ button to illustrate the information available to managers in the table on the RHS. Note, however, that our software left these
values blank when managers had to make their allocation decision.



























































N 496 496 496 496 
Wald χ  154.102 79.225 176.619 80.195 
Model Degrees of Freedom 9 9 11 11 
p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
p-levels are two-tailed, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; the round parentheses contain robust standard 
errors that are as if they are clustered by firm; all equations use an exchangeable within-group correlation 
structure. 
Total Welfare = Payoff Owner + Payoff Employee + Payoff Employee 
Welfare Dispersion = max{Payoff Owner, Payoff Employee, Payoff Manager} – min{Payoff Owner, Payoff 
Employee, Payoff Manager} 
Full Reporting: 1 when the manager chose to report exclusively to the owner and employee, else 0 
Owner Reporting: 1 when the manager chose to report exclusively to the owner, else 0 














































































N 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Wald χ  282.376 96.707 298.979 103.542 
Model Degrees of Freedom 11 11 13 13 
p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
p-levels are two-tailed, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; the round parentheses contain robust standard 
errors that are as if they are clustered by firm; all equations use an exchangeable within-group correlation 
structure. 
Total Welfare = Payoff Owner + Payoff Employee + Payoff Employee 
Welfare Dispersion = max{Payoff Owner, Payoff Employee, Payoff Manager} – min{Payoff Owner, Payoff 
Employee, Payoff Manager} 
Full Reporting: 1 when the manager chose to report exclusively to the owner and employee, else 0 
Owner Reporting: 1 when the manager chose to report exclusively to the owner, else 0 














































































N = 496; p-levels are two-tailed, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; RMSEA = 0.031; 𝜒  = 5.912 and p-value = 0.206; CFI = 0.999; SRMR = 0.002; The 
round parentheses contain robust standard errors clustered by firm; all equations in each model include period fixed-effects to control for time trends and 
effects; Investment is equals the owner’s investment; Production equals employee’s production; Wealth equals Economic Power × Production; Employee 
Share equals the share of Wealth allocated by the manager to the employee; Owner Share equals the share of Wealth allocated by the manager to the owner; 
Full Reporting equals 1 when the manager chose to report exclusively to the owner and employee, else 0; Owner Reporting equals 1 when the manager chose 















































































Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
AIC 1223.976 
BIC 1425.892 
N = 496; p-levels are two-tailed, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; The round parentheses contain robust 
standard errors clustered by manager; Full Reporting equals 1 when the manager chose to report to the 
owner and employee, else 0;  Employee Reporting equals 1 when the manager chose to report to the 
employee, else 0;  Owner Reporting equals 1 when the manager chose to report to the owner, else 0; Grit: 
average of eight grit short-scale items rated on a 7-point Likert scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.668 
(Duckworth and Quinn 2009); Period equals the number of the period from 1 through 8; Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Openness Experience are averages of Big-Five 
Short items on a 7-point Likert scale (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann. 2003), and Prosocial and 
Individualist are dummy variables based on the Social Value Orientation scale (Van Lange, Bekkers, 
Schuyt, and Van Vugt 2007). 
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